

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XIX.

March, 1913.

No. 3.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

PUBLISHED BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. FURST COMPANY, PRINTERS,
BALTIMORE.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XIX.

March, 1913.

No. 3.

CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.

If Atheism errs by defect, in denying that there is a God, Pantheism may be said to err by excess, in affirming that everything is God. Atheism asserts that God is not a reality, Pantheism holds that He is the only reality. And it is a singular phenomenon that the human mind, left to itself, swings inevitably from one extreme to the other. Philosophy began by being pantheistic. For the ancient Hindus, followers of the doctrines of the Veda, there is but one reality, God, and all else is illusion. And ever since then, there has been a constantly recurring alternation of pantheism and atheism. "All is God," "There is no God": an age of pantheistic mysticism is succeeded by an age of atheistic or agnostic disbelief. This succession, inevitable, apparently, when the human mind is left to its own resources, is proof to the Catholic philosopher that there is need of Faith to supplement the efforts of reason and to correct the errors into which reason so frequently falls.

The pantheistic view of the universe as identical with God has much to recommend it to the incautious mind. Indeed, one may go farther and say that it has much to recommend it to the better type of mind. The failure to recognize the distinction between God and His creatures, or between God and matter, is a fine fault compared with that of the atheist, for whom there is no God. The pantheist is almost of necessity a

poet, and often a mystic. He "sees much beauty where most men see naught." His enthusiasm for nature carries him to the point of deifying it. His misdirected mysticism betrays him into the conviction that not only are natural phenomena to be interpreted in terms of the spiritual, but that they are in very fact spiritual realities. For him, Nature is not the veil that hides the Infinite: it is the Infinite. He takes all too literally such phrases as "Nature is His Garment," "Nature is His voice." In the harmony of color and design visible throughout the universe he sees, literally, the vast embroidered robe wrapped around the Great Invisible. In the symphony of sound, articulate or inarticulate, which all the spiritual-minded are accustomed to call the voice of God in Nature, in the habits and instincts of animals, in the half-articulate yearnings of the human heart itself, the mystic pantheist believes that he listens really to the call of the Great Inaudible. By every sense, internal and external, he lays hold on Divinity. He is immersed, so to speak, in the Divine, and saturated with it, like a happy flower that bathes in the radiance and warmth of the sun in June. And, like the mystic, he falls naturally into figurative and poetic language. He scorns to reason like a logician. He feels the Divine Presence, and that is enough. He sings while others syllogize; he raves while others reason; he appeals while others argue. Hence the peculiar charm of Pantheism for the mind that is esthetic, and hence also its peculiar danger for the spiritually minded. It is an error that attracts by its apparent sublimity, and entices by the subtle fragrance of its poetry. It was all the more necessary, then, that minds for which materialism and atheism has no charm should be warned against the error of pantheism and that the distinction between the universe and its maker should be emphasized in a manner that appeals to every intelligence.

The Christian Church in its doctrine and discipline has not only asserted the distinct personality of God as a Being distinct from the Universe, but has also had recourse to formal condemnation of the doctrine that God and the universe are one. Over and over again the voice of authority was raised,

not only against formal and aggressive heretics who sought to disturb the peace of the Church, not only against those from outside who might be suspected of trying to overthrow the Church, but against the quiet mystic within the Church, the saint, sometimes, whose intentions were most worthy, but whose doctrine, nevertheless, tended to obliterate the distinction between God and creatures. And when, in our own day, pantheism assumed its most subtle form in the transcendental metaphysics which at first sight affords so safe a refuge from atheism and materialism, the authority of Pope and Council were asserted in condemnation and warning. This was surely no inconsiderable service to the cause of truth. If Pantheism is erroneous, as we believe it to be, if it is subtle and specious, as we know it to be, then the warning is a help which philosophy should welcome, a hand held out to reason at a moment when there was danger ahead.

What has philosophy to say about pantheism? Let us go back to first principles and the primary conditions of human thinking. Experience tells us that there are distinctions among things. Experience also tells us that there are similarities. Perhaps our first experiences as children are experiences of differences or distinctions. To the child mind each day is a new day, full of incidents and adventures unlike anything that ever happened before. Each object of his interest is a miracle of newness and strangeness. I do not mean now merely that his imagination is over-active and helps him to fill his little world—commonplace enough, perhaps, and lacking in the picturesque—with all kinds of pleasant and fearful shapes. I don't mean that the child's world is strange because of this force of fancy. I mean that he naturally accentuates differences and at first overlooks or fails to emphasize similarities. With reflection, however, comes the power to sift his experiences and to realise that while things are, in some ways, all different from one another, they are, in other ways, all related to one another by similarities. Our progress in natural science opens up new vistas of the unities of things disparate. The boy who uses a sling-shot may know something in a practical way about what

is called centrifugal force. He knows that his bicycle wheel scatters moisture and mud, and perhaps someone tells him that that is another instance of the same force at work. In his first lessons in astronomy he learns that the same force is partly responsible for the courses of the planets and the movement of the earth on its orbit. Science is constantly revealing unsuspected unities and bringing together under laws or causes phenomena which at first sight are simply different, and have no similarity at all. Human nature, also, furnishes us with examples. I think that as we grow older we are moving towards that condition of philosophic calm in which one is surprised at nothing. When we were younger many things surprised us, because many things were new to us. Later we can parallel every strange action by an action as strange or even stranger, that happened before. We are, indeed, in danger of overlooking the differences among people, and saying and believing that they are all alike.

Now, this is only one line of development of our knowledge. There is another, and an equally important one, which goes in the opposite direction. It is the tendency to emphasize the differences among things. For science not only surprises us by pointing out unexpected similarities, it surprises us no less by calling our attention to the permanence of differences. No two things are exactly alike. The philosophers even ask the question whether there *could be* two things exactly alike. And in our experience of human nature, it is the same. The older we grow the more we are inclined to make due allowance for the "abysmal depth of personality." If you are wise, you will indeed, put people into certain groups or classes, and treat them accordingly; but, when anything very important depends on your line of action, you will make the individual the object of your special and earnest study. You will not treat him or even argue with him "according to his kind," as the saying is, but according to his own peculiar individuality.

Our knowledge, then, develops along these two lines. We are constantly discovering similarities among things, and we are no less constantly discovering differences among those same

things. What does the philosopher do? "Something absurd," the cynic will exclaim. Well, yes, in some instances. There is the philosopher who sees only the differences among things, who is so unreasonable as to say that there are no similarities, that everything is purely and simply different from everything else and that the so-called similarities are illusions. He is called the Pluralist, and we shall have more to say about him when we come to Pragmatism. There is, on the other hand, the philosopher who is so absurd as to overlook the differences of things, and to maintain that all things are not only similar but identical. He is called the monist. He says that all things are in reality one and the same thing, and that the differences among things are merely an error or illusion of the mind. But, some one will say, why doesn't the philosopher have common sense and admit with the rest of us that there *are* differences and, at the same time, that there *are* similarities? Well, that is what some philosophers do, who are neither monists nor pluralists, and among those somewhat unostentatious philosophers we may, I think, put down our own names unobtrusively, after we have examined monism and pluralism and realized that each is only a partial truth.

Our concern at present is with the monistic tendency. It is a very old one in philosophy. Indeed, it may be said to be the oldest of all, as Pluralism is the newest of all. It is often associated with the tendency to mysticism. Thus, the ancient Hindus imagined the soul to be born in a state of bondage to the flesh, from which it is freed only by a realization of the oneness of all things in *Brahma*. The "fleeting show," which is the world of our experience, with all its pageantry of color and form, with its vicissitudes and its successions, with its varieties, contrasts and harmonies, does not exist at all. It is *maya*, or illusion. As soon as we are rid of the illusion, and the phantoms that deceived us have vanished, when reason begins to be free from the thralldom of sense, we realize that there is but one reality, namely God, and that nothing is real except in so far as it is identical with Him. All the distinctions and diversities of things are errors of the created mind; all is

one and one is All. It is easy to get rid of a disagreeable or a discordant fact and to establish in triumph one's own theory, if one is allowed, in this way, to make a mesmeric pass over the facts that are so stubborn and cause them to vanish into thin air. That is how the monist treats the facts that seem to stand for diversities among things. "As different as chalk and cheese," says the somewhat homely English proverb. "No, my dear Sir," the monist seems to say, "chalk and cheese are not different; the color, the taste, the other qualities which you think you perceive in them, and which, you say, make them to be different, are illusions of your senses. When all these qualities are removed there is no difference between the chalk and the cheese. They are the same reality." I say that this tendency to regard all reality as one is almost always a preliminary to the mystic tendency. Once the illusoriness of the senses is granted, it is evident that the only knowledge that avails us is a knowledge of our identity with God. It follows that we should cultivate that knowledge and so, *save our souls*, by sinking back into the consciousness of God.

The monistic tendency is the philosophic tendency itself, but carried too far. The desire to find harmony in apparent discord, to find unity in apparent diversity, to find similarity in apparent variety is the root of the propensity to philosophise. The fault we find with monism is that it is, to use a common phrase, "a good thing carried too far." There is a unity among things. There is a unity of origin and a unity of destiny—from God to God, is, we think a history of all the created universe. There is, we think, a unity of plan or design, and all things are moving towards the fulfillment of that plan, although we may not hope to understand how. And there are manifest similarities among things which no amount of reasoning can remove. Chalk is like cheese, at least in name; and that, by the way, is the reason of the proverb. Monism is right in insisting on these unities, but we think it is wrong when it goes farther, and does away with all diversity and multiplicity. Its method may be subtle; it is none the less fallacious; it may be more learned, perhaps, but it is not more logical than that of the

ancient sophist who argued that if you are the brother of one man you are the brother of all, for you cannot be a brother and not a brother at the same time. By fallacious reasoning monism argues away the differences of things, leaving only an all-inclusive unity. When this unity is in God or rather, when the one reality is identified with God, monism becomes pantheism.

Pantheism, therefore, like monism is a result of the philosophical instinct for unity carried too far. Pantheism sacrifices some of the most important attributes of reality in order to maintain that the Supreme Reality is the only reality. It sacrifices the personality of God; it sacrifices morality; it sacrifices immortality; it sacrifices freedom.

Pantheism sacrifices the personality of God. In order that God be a person, He must be distinct from the Universe and different from it. He must not only be a substantial entity, but must be a conscious Being, an individual, self-initiating in His actions, and free. This is, perhaps, a highly metaphysical array of attributes constituting personality. Let us try the problem from a more popular side. A person must have intelligence and will, that is to say, must be able to think and free to act. A flower has no intelligence of its own; it has no power of initiating its actions freely. It may, indeed, manifest the intelligence of another; for instance, the intelligence of the Creator who made it, or of the gardener who cultivated and cared for it. But, it has no intelligence of its own. Neither has it free choice. No matter how poetic one may become on the subject of the beauty of a flower, one could not, without being absurd, attribute to the flower's moral goodness, its delicacy of fragrance, its brilliancy of color or its perfection of shape. Now, in the pantheistic conception of God personality is not included, and cannot be included. God, the Pantheist is forced to admit, has no more moral goodness than a flower. He has no more intelligence than a flower. As Spinoza somewhat crudely phrased it, one would no more think of praising God for His goodness or His intelligence than one would think of praising a triangle because the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles. The comparison is, perhaps, shocking to our

sense of reverence; but it is apt, and brings out very forcibly the pantheistic idea of God. By sacrificing the personality of God the Pantheist sacrifices the very essentials of religion. There is no religion without prayer. There is, we think, no religion without worship and sacrifice. There is no religion where there is no possibility of gratitude, obedience, love. In a word, religion implies personal acts and a personal attitude on both sides. It is the relation of a person to a person. It is true that, in careless phrase, we talk of obeying the law, and by exuberant hyperbole we talk of worshipping the ground on which so and so walks, and we "love" all kinds of things, from the Author of our being down to the latest fad in popular music or something equally trivial. We know that we do not mean these phrases literally. When we use the term strictly we obey not the law but the lawgiver, we worship, not the ground but the person who walks on it, we love only those towards whom our state of mind is a personal one. If, then, Pantheism makes it impossible for us to love God, to obey God, to worship God, to pray to God, then, Pantheism may fairly be accused of robbing religion of its essentials and setting up the idea of a God who is no God at all.

Pantheism sacrifices morality and reduces conscience to an absurdity. If we are identical with God, if we are all one reality, then there is no true distinction of persons. It follows that our actions and the responsibility for them are not ours but God's. This thought is appalling enough. There is no need to elaborate it. It follows, moreover, since there is no distinction of persons, that our conscience of injury and injustice is entirely erroneous. If the thief and the person robbed are the same reality, where does the injury come in? If the murderer and the murdered person are the same reality, where is the iniquity of murder? I do not mean to say that all pantheists are in favor of theft and murder; I am merely pointing out the consequences which, by force of logic, follow from the doctrine of Pantheism. The moral consequences, or rather, the immoral consequences which follow from that doctrine, if logic has any force at all, are enough to show that Pantheism, when

in its mad monistic career it sacrifices all distinction among things, sacrifices too much.

Pantheism sacrifices immortality. Immortality means not merely that the soul survives the body, but that we, as persons, shall continue to exist and to recognize ourselves as the same individuals. It means the continuation of individual consciousness and personality. In any minor sense, immortality is a delusion and the defeat of all our aspirations. "I shall not all die" is the instinctive hope of every human being, which Christian philosophy satisfies in the doctrine of personal immortality. Anything like absorption in the deity, return to the Consciousness of the All, mergence in the mind of the universe is less than that hope. Yet this is all that the Pantheist can offer us. Indeed, if Pantheism is right, our case is worse after death than before, for while we are here below we may, in spite of the Pantheist, cling to the illusion of our separate and distinct personality; but when Death comes, we are cured of that illusion for ever, and are merged in the Total Consciousness of which we are even now a part. The thought is not only disheartening. It is utterly inadmissible. Once more, in sacrificing true immortality, Pantheism sacrifices too much.

Finally, Pantheism sacrifices freedom. Our souls, says the Pantheist, are nearer to God than anything else in the universe; but, for that very reason, they are under greater compulsion than anything else to obey the laws that govern the Universe. We are involved in a vortex of cosmic changes, of political and social forces, of heredity, environment and education. These determine our actions and we must yield to their force. We may, indeed, delude ourselves with the thought that we are free. The leaf floating with the current may imagine that it has the power to turn around and go up stream; it may fondly believe that it can avoid the whirlpool ahead or seek it by preference to the clear and calmer current that runs alongside. We know, however, that it cannot, and we should know, too, says the Pantheist, that we are just as irresistibly impelled by the All, of which we are a part, as the leaf is by the stream on which it floats. Briefly, Pantheism has ruled out freedom as thought-

lessly or incautiously as it ruled out God, immortality and conscience. It has done this for the sake of maintaining the unity of all things in God, and we think that, in doing it, pantheism has paid too dear a price.

Is there, then, any truth in Pantheism? We have said, perhaps, enough of its faults, of the consequences to which it leads, and by which it is condemned. Has it any merit? It must have; otherwise, it could hardly have persisted and recurred so constantly in the history of philosophy. It has one point in its favor. It is, as was said above, the error of a nobler type of mind. It ennobles and transfigures the world of nature, it beautifies the universe, saturating all things, so to speak, with the Divine. It appeals in this way to the poetic mind. It appeals also to the philosophic mind. For the philosophical mind seeks unification, as the poetic mind seeks spiritual interpretation, of our experience, or, rather, of reality. The merit of pantheism is that it responds to this instinct. The fault of pantheism is that it carries this instinct too far; it sacrifices to unification things which may not be sacrificed. That it carries the philosophic impulse too far is proved by its consequences. And yet, there is an element of truth in Pantheism, which, more than anything else, has given it a career and, as was said, an almost permanent place in the history of philosophy. Pantheism explains the presence of God in the universe. Christian theology and Christian theism hold also the doctrine of divine presence, and hold it in a manner compatible with the personality of God. "In Him," says St. Paul, "we live and move and have our being." This is the classic statement of the fact, if one may so describe a biblical phrase. "In Him we live and move and have our being." It is, then, a presence ubiquitous, intimate, vital. But, while the fact is thus clearly and peremptorily stated, how are we to explain this presence? How are we to visualize it? We have recourse, naturally, to comparisons and to figures of speech. We say that God is present in the Universe, as the agent is present in his work. So, for example, the author is present in a book that he has written. The book contains his thoughts, his sentiments, his personality, to some

extent, and his character. We say that he speaks to us from the pages of his book. As long as the book lives he will live. So the architect is present in the building which he has designed, the sculptor in the statue that he has moulded or carved, the painter in the canvas that he has painted, and the craftsman in the work of his hands. These, however, are mere figures of speech, so far as the real personality of the author or agent is concerned. The writer is not between the pages of the book, the sculptor is not embedded in the bronze, the painter is not hidden behind the canvas, the workman is not in the chair or the table that he has made. God is present in the Universe in a truer sense, and in a sense more intimate and vital. He is nearer to us, says the mystic, than we ourselves are. And so we must abandon that set of comparisons and try another. God is present in that He sustains at every moment the creatures whom He called out of nothingness, and cöoperates in a true sense with them in every action of theirs. He causes the fire to burn, the plant to grow, the animal to move, the mind of man to think. "In Him we live and move and have our being." We turn, therefore, to another comparison and with the Stoics we say that God is commingled in the Universe. He penetrates every minute and remote particle of matter. He is in all things, and in the heart of everything that lives. The universe is filled with Him, as the sponge is saturated with water, as the air is interpenetrated by some highly volatile perfume, as the atmosphere some summer day is shot through and through with sunshine. There is no intermingling of material things, no diffusion of energy through matter more thorough, more complete nor more perfect than the commingling of God with the universe which He sustains and governs. Yet, once more, these are only comparisons and figures that fall short of the reality. God, though a substance, is not a material substance. He is a spirit, and a spirit cannot be mingled with matter in any true sense of the word. Even material things, sometimes, will not mingle with one another. Oil will not mix with water. How much less spirit with matter. The thought is absurd; we must turn to another comparison. We seem to

have the right comparison, the very image of God's presence in the Universe, in the relation between soul and body in ourselves. And this is, of all the pantheistic comparisons, the most popular and—the most fallacious. God is the soul, the Universe is the body. How apt, at first sight, and how satisfying to the vaguely reflective mind. The notion is very old indeed. It goes very far back into the history of human thought. Yet, it too, will have to be abandoned. In the first place, the comparison does not illumine. For, if we know little of the manner in which God is present in His Universe, we know almost as little about the manner of the soul's presence in the body. In the one case as in the other, the fact is undeniable, while the explanation of the fact is mysterious, and the mode or manner of it baffles our intelligence. Besides, though the soul is a spirit, it is not an infinite spirit as God is, and it is the infinity of God that makes it so difficult for us to understand His presence in the world.

One thing the Pantheist accomplishes. He emphasizes what is called the immanence of God in the Universe, that is, the doctrine that God is not only present in the universe but also, as it were, commingled with it, and, in someway, identified with it. But this is only a part of the truth, only one term, really, of the problem. The Deist goes to the opposite extreme. He teaches that God is greater than the Universe, and even goes so far as to say that God is not in the universe at all, that He takes no part in its preservation or its activities, that He is, so to speak, above concerning Himself about it; He made it out of nothing and then left it, as it were, to its own devices. This is the doctrine of transcendence, another part of the truth, another term of the problem. If we let our minds dwell on the immanence of God in the universe, we see the partial truth of pantheism. If we attend only to the transcendence of God in respect to the universe, we perceive the partial truth of deism. But partial truths are errors, and errors of the worst kind, because they are generally plausible. Christian theism acknowledges that both pantheism and deism are right, and insists at the same time that both are wrong. Pantheism is

right, because God does really dwell in the Universe; it is wrong, because God is, so to speak, outside the Universe as well. Deism is right, because God does transcend the Universe; it is wrong, because God is also immanent in the Universe. In this case, however, it is not true that "a hair divides the true and false!" There is a whole world of difference, and of practical difference between Pantheism, Deism and Christian Theism.

Catholic philosophy takes up the problem from the point of view of reason. It points out, as we did above, that the consequences of pantheism condemn it. If pantheism is true, then, since we are God, all actions are good and all men are equally good. When the pantheist is as honest as Spinoza was, he accepts this consequence. "No action, considered in itself, is either good or bad," says the great Dutch metaphysician. For us, this is a sufficient *reductio ad absurdum* of Pantheism.

In the next place, Catholic philosophy calls attention to the true cause of pantheism or of monism in general. It traces the monistic propensity to the inordinate desire of unification and the consequent neglect to observe diversities. Facts, we commonly say, are stubborn things. But, for the framer of a theory, facts are very yielding. He makes them or ignores them to suit his purpose. Especially does the theorist ignore facts that do not agree with his theory. Like the Queen in *Alice in Wonderland*, if a fact offends him he roars "Off with its head." Now common sense will not be silenced by any such threats, but insists that facts are facts. There are differences among things which no amount of theory can cause to disappear. Perhaps, to quote again from *Alice*, when the monist asks *why* are there differences, we may be allowed to imitate the March Hare and answer *Why not?* The *why* does not affect the fact; our inability to explain does not abolish the fact. If there are differences among things, then the monist is in error when he holds that all reality is one. Unification is an admirable thing; the unity that science has shown to exist among things is an awe-inspiring revelation of the beauty and harmony of God's creation. But, because partial unification is admirable that does not prevent complete unification from being absurd.

Finally, Catholic philosophy goes directly to the heart of the question in this way. The Pantheist holds that God is infinite, and yet that He is identical with the Universe. This, we say, is a contradiction in terms. On the one hand, the Infinite never changes,—on the other, the Universe is constantly changing. The Infinite never changes; for to lose what it has or to acquire what it has not is to cease to be infinite. And yet, the Universe changes; it changes continuously and ceaselessly. Indeed, change is a law of its very existence. Ever since the days of Heraclitus, philosophers have called attention to this. And our own reflection on our experience shows that they are right. The heavens above us, the earth beneath us, the air that surrounds us, our own bodies and the bodies of other living things, our minds and our thoughts, the products of our industry and of our thinking,—everything that God has made or man has constructed is involved in a vortex of change. Even while I am talking to you about change every thing except the Infinite has changed. You have changed, I have changed, the sun, the moon, the stars, the earth have changed. So prevalent is change that it would seem to be the very height of absurdity to deny it. And thus the Pantheist is between Scylla and Charybdis. He may deny the existence of change and so defy the verdict of our experience, or he may hold that the Infinite changes and so defy human reason which declares that that is impossible.

Of course there is a subterfuge. There always is. In this case, the way of escape is by the use of the word *development*. The Infinite-Universe, says the up-to-date Pantheist, does not change; it develops. The thought, it must be confessed, is not only clever; it has a certain fascination. The Infinite always was the Infinite, as the acorn always was an oak. The acorn develops root and sprout and trunk and branch and leaf, unfolding in each successive stage the beauty that was in it, hidden all the time. So the Infinite has the cosmic cycle for the term of its life-history. First, in the morning of creation, it was a mass of nebula containing the potencies of all things; then, by stages that stretched out over millions of years, it

literally threw off the bodies that form our astronomical world. The earth, at first formless and void, cooled, contracted, and in time gave life to plant and animal and man. The Infinite, then, has suffered no increment or decrease; it has neither gained nor lost; it has not really changed; it has only developed. All of which goes to show how a Pantheist may, as the French say, "pay himself with words." For, development is only another name for change. But let us take the example of the acorn. There is there a process of development, or, perhaps, of development and growth. But, let us see what the development is. It is a series of changes brought about partly by forces and elements inherent in the seed, and partly by influences and factors extrinsic to it. Substitute a piece of dead wood for the acorn and, of course, it will not develop even in the best conditions of soil and moisture and warmth and light. On the other hand, the best selected acorn will not germinate without these outside influences. This is elementary. Now, in which way does the Infinite develop? Reason says, in neither. It cannot produce in itself an activity or perfection which it did not already possess, and it cannot be indebted to any outside influence for a perfection or state of being which it did not already possess. Please do not misunderstand. I do not deny that the universe has developed or is developing. All that the astronomers and the geologists have to say about cosmic evolution may be true. Much of what biologists have to say about biological evolution is true. But it is the universe, not the Infinite, that evolves, and the fact that it does evolve, since evolution is change, goes to show that the universe and the Infinite are not the same.

To these considerations, which are purely rational, in the sense that they are derived from reason and appeal to our reason, Catholic philosophy adds other considerations which are of a theological nature, in so far as they rest, not on reason, but on revelation. The question at issue is the Personality of God. If all things are one, and God is all things, then, evidently, God is not a Person distinct from the Universe. Reason has said her say. She does not accept the conclusion of the

Pantheist. Now, let Faith speak. And there is need of the voice of Faith. For Pantheism is a subtle doctrine and a specious doctrine. It has ensnared some of the noblest minds. Materialism repels many minds by its crudity. Atheism disappoints, because it is, after all, a negation. Deism dissatisfies because it relegates God to a more philosophical presupposition at the beginning of the Universe, and leaves Him there. Pantheism has a charm, a fatal attractiveness for the poet, the mystic and the reflective lover of nature. It is optimistic, for if everything is God, everything is good. It is supremely positive, for it fixes the mind on the permanent and the perfect and simply ignores the changeable and the imperfect. It is esthetically satisfying, because it suffuses all natural events with the divine presence and the divine beauty; for pantheism nothing is mean or commonplace or trivial. In the snow-crystal, in the microscopic plant cell, in the music of running water as well as in the laughter of children, in the boisterousness of youth, in the patient sweetness of old age, in the lowly weed and the neglected bramble as well as in the waywardness of the outcast and the sorrows of the unfortunate—everywhere, in evil and in good, in ugliness and in beauty it sees the one, the same Infinite God. These views need only to be suggested in order that their attractiveness be evident. How much more enticing are they when elaborated with proper feeling and dressed up with proper taste by a mystic or a poet. Therefore, to offset the danger that is never absent, there must be an authoritative voice that proclaims the truth of God's distinct personality without fear or favor. "The God of metaphysics," wrote Joubert, "is but an idea; the God of religion, the Creator of heaven and earth, the sovereign Judge of actions and of thoughts, is a force." This is very true. The Pantheist is content with a God who is only an idea; all the yearnings of his poetic heart are turned toward Nature. The Christian regards God as Creator, Ruler and Judge; he treats Nature as the work of God's hands, the sphere in which Providence is exercised, the opportunity given to him to work out his own salvation. He will be as appreciative of beauty as the panthe-

ist. He will see in everything the beauty of God, but one stage removed, participated, imitated, reflected. He will let his sympathies go out as freely as the pantheist does, to all that rejoice and to all that suffer. But he will restrain his sympathy. He will not, if I may use the word, become hysterical over anything in Nature, because he retains always a sense of his own responsibility to God, and therefore, a sense of his true dignity as a human being.

The Christian Church has repressed Pantheism by decrees and condemnations, realizing that between Pantheism and the Christian Creed there is no compromise. And if the measures of repression seem to us to have been harsh and unduly severe at times, we may deplore the manner and yet not fail to appreciate the benefit of the Church's action. Time has softened manners and customs, but it should not diminish our abhorrence of error, especially of an error so subtle and so destructive as Pantheism.

The Church has exercised her function as a teacher and in that rôle has tried to offset Pantheism. She has presented the personality of God to the popular mind by all the various means suited to the capacity of the popular mind. To the learned and philosophical she has offered arguments, distinctions, definitions; to the unlettered she has brought images, symbols and representations of the truth appealing to the senses and to the imagination. To the esthetically inclined she has thrown open the field of Christian art, in which sculptor and painter and builder and musician give artistic expression to her doctrines and bring those doctrines home to minds that seek the beautiful as well as the true.

Finally, she has tried to satisfy those yearnings of the human heart to which Pantheism so powerfully appeals. All her sacred poetry, her mysticism, her ascetic theology even, are instinct with the impulse to beautify nature and to consider natural phenomena as symbols of spiritual realities. In a cruder age the village preacher was provided with a little volume of illustrations for sermons, a curiously credulous account of animal and plant and mineral, setting forth those characteristics of

each which furnish inspiration to conduct, and interpreting each trait in terms of the soul. These *Bestiaries*, as they are called, served their purpose well. They interest us now as literary curiosities; but they should interest us also as showing how, in the ages of Faith Nature was interpreted spiritually. And St. Francis of Assisi! Everyone knows how beautifully tender was his sentiment towards bird and beast and flower. They are, he said, our brothers and our sisters. They are God's children, as we are; but children who never offend Him, and from whom, therefore, we may learn a lesson. Indeed, St. Francis goes so far in his spiritual interpretation of Nature that he has, grotesquely enough, been accused of Pantheism. The Greeks are said to have lacked a proper appreciation of the beauties of Nature. Whether this is true or not, it is certainly true that the Middle Ages were not lacking in that sentiment. Their art as well as their literature show that, in their way of thinking, every least creature of God shows forth in some way the Infinite Beauty which is His. And let me say, without intention to offend, that those Christian sects which have discarded ritual and ceremonial and symbolism and the sacraments have never produced a mystic poetry like that of Herrick and Coventry Patmore and Francis Thompson. It is either the cold, matter of fact, scientific interpretation of Nature or the exuberant and exaggerated estheticism of the Pantheist; either Nature without God or Nature identical with God. The most thoughtful Catholic poetry has avoided both these faults and neither excluded God from Nature, as the Atheist does nor included Him in Nature, as the Pantheist does. "Religion," says Joubert once more, "is the poetry of the heart." It is its mission not only to teach us what is true and to enable us to practice what is right, but also, though it may sound strange in your ears, to show us how to enjoy life. I mean that it is the business of religion to inculcate that view of life which enables us to look out on Nature as God's creation, distinct, indeed, from Him in substance, but filled with the beauty of His presence, and pulsating with the gladness of His Beauty and the joy of His Supremely perfect Life. Catholic

philosophy has felt this influence. It has rejoiced in it, welcomed it, and I may say, prospered under it. It has been able to retain all that is alluring in Pantheism without the consequences of Pantheism. It has been able to justify the enthusiasm of the mystic poet without being obliged to sanction extravagance of sentiment. It has had the powerful influence of authority to enable it to maintain a clear and a consistent distinction between a God wholly immanent in the Universe, a God wholly transcendent in respect to the Universe, and a God both immanent and transcendent. This is one of the advantages that Catholic philosophy enjoys, owing to its recognition of the principle that *Faith aids Reason*.

WILLIAM TURNER.

HISTORIOGRAPHY, ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL.

History has a twofold meaning. It may signify past events or the narrative of past events. In the former or objective sense history refers to what is antecedent and has undergone change; in its latter or subjective meaning it is the apprehension and presentation of antecedent reality. Thus the history of Rome or of the Roman Empire viewed as a series of actual occurrences is not by any means synonymous with the history of Rome as narrated by Mommsen or Tillemont. In a restricted and more commonly accepted use of the word, history is applied only to human history, or to events which happened through the agency of men as moral beings. Historiography naturally deals only with subjective history or the effort to reproduce the past or some of its phases, and the history of historiography is a record of such efforts.

That historiography has a history cannot be denied. It is a form of literature, and more, perhaps, than any other form of literature it mirrors faithfully man's conception of his place in the universe, and his capacity to give expression to one of the most cogent influences in life. On its subjective side history is a science and an art. Consequently any adequate presentation of the development of historical composition implies the necessity of being able to determine how historians at different times conceived their task, what ideas they possessed of the nature and function of history, what methods they followed in equipping themselves to know and present events of which they could have no immediate knowledge, and how they viewed these events, whether as unconnected with what went before and without influence on what came after, or as being determined by certain laws and forming, in their relationships, a well ordered organic system following definite lines of change. Each of these subjects offers a special field for historical investigation. History did not always mean the same thing. It was a subject

that did not easily lend itself to definition. The process by which it was emancipated from the domination of superstition and imagination and took its place as a science of reality was a slow one. The didactic value of history was never lost sight of, but with wider knowledge event and incident became secondary to relationship and sequence.

So, too, in regard to the materials of history. Men were slow in devising methods by which evidence might be sifted, and by which the past might be made to yield up the sources necessary for the enlightenment of the present. In classifying the phenomena of history and assigning them to their proper category, the mind of man did not wait on the tardy processes of empirical investigation. His philosophy is deductive as well as inductive, and without any knowledge of the scientific processes necessary to reveal the true character of historical events or their relationships, a Philosophy of history or what may for want of a better term be called a Philosophy of History, was evolved which linked incident and action with the prevailing notions of human nature and human destiny. Historiography in the true sense does not attain its real stature until it is prepared to offer a sound conception of the nature and scope of history, until its processes, scientific, critical, and exegetical are in accordance with recognized canons of Historic, and until by reflection and speculation it gives an explanation of the course of human events.

The progress of historiography, therefore, is marked by the advances which have been made in clarifying the idea of history, in the processes by which evidence regarding the past can be attained with greater certainty, and presented with greater force, and in the widening knowledge of the causes which underlie the phenomena of history. Hence it is that there are well marked periods in the progress of historical study, and well defined boundaries between which historiography in some of its phases remained unchanged. The development of historical research is not due to the efforts of historians so much as to the development of other branches of science, many of which it has drawn on heavily.

Following the usual division of general history into ancient, mediaeval and modern, historiography is generally said to have passed through three corresponding periods. There is no unanimity among historians as to the exact time the ancient world ended and the mediaeval commenced, nor as to the precise dividing line between the middle ages and modern times. In like manner the course of historiography has its stages of change and development, but these cannot be sharply distinguished. There are few abrupt transformations in the course of human events, one epoch usually changes into another by a slow process of transformation. To follow the process of change and development in historical studies is rendered almost impossible by the fact that certain departments of historiography advanced more rapidly than others, that history as an art reached its apex before history as a science was dreamt of, that method sometimes outran, sometimes lagged behind theory. That there has been a transformation in historiography is evident from the difference between the hero-tales of antiquity and the latest volume from a German professor with its fine exemplification of scientific method, or that of a Frenchman with its blend of scientific accuracy and consummate literary form. The difference, however, is not all real achievement, at no time was the subject of definition of history more warmly debated than at present, and at no time did literary as opposed to scientific history find more ardent and distinguished advocates. There are good grounds, nevertheless, for maintaining that there has been real progress in historical study. How real and substantial this progress has been can be realized from the manner in which one epoch surpassed another in the promotion and perfection of method, in the exemplification of higher historical conceptions, or in the elaboration of sound principles of criticism and exegesis. Historiography, however, owes its progress to no epoch in particular. As consummate exponents of literary history the Greeks have had no equals; but they never succeeded in raising history to its true level nor in acquiring a Philosophy of History. Christianity did both. It concerned itself, however, less with the form than with the substance, and the mediae-

val writers followed the methods and models of their pagan predecessors. The Renaissance gave birth to a real spirit of research and criticism, and the religious conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries laid the foundation if they did not bring to perfection the methods in vogue in all the schools of the present, yet neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation made any real contribution in the matter of Philosophy of History. History received a new direction and assumed new functions under the hands of the Humanists and the Protestants, but they gave no formal account of its underlying causes.

In instituting a comparison therefore between ancient and mediaeval historiography our purpose is neither to give a detailed enumeration nor analysis of the writings of pagan or of Christian authors. Such a task would exceed the limits of this article. Attention will simply be drawn to the idea of history as manifested in the two epochs, to the methods followed by the writers of history, and to the theory or lack of theory which they present as affording a reasonable basis for the sequence and causation of events. By ancient historiography will be understood those works on history which drew their motive from the ancient pagan culture, and by mediaeval those which came from Christian pens prior to the Renaissance movement.

Human interest in the happenings of the past and its expression in literary form has passed through many stages. The standard by which this progression may be followed can be found in the mental state of the narrator or in the character of the narrative. "The methods of treating history (divided by Hegel into the naïve, the reflecting and the speculative) may be classed as the empirical, the critical and the philosophical, according as the simple collocation of materials, the examination of the credibility of tradition, or the endeavor to reach an understanding of the causes and significance of events is made the predominant feature." The stages indicated here correspond very closely to three classes of historical writings, simple records, pragmatic, and genetic history, which also designate the relative advances made in exposition, not, however,

that the cultivation of the second or the third entirely superseded or eliminated those which went before.

The earliest form of historical composition is found in the songs and stories of primitive peoples. These uncultured pioneers had practically no link with the past except memory, and were so much dominated by imagination, and expressed themselves with so much feeling and imagery that if their productions even contained a kernel of fact it can never be disengaged from its poetical setting. It is only by a wide extension of the meaning of the word that sagas and hero tales can be called history, and their only right to such a designation is that they are such in form and purport if not in content.

History may be said to have first come into existence when records were kept in order to aid memory. These records were in the beginning of the simplest character, but were made to serve many purposes. This stage represents a very considerable degree of progress; for, as Flint says, "Nothing seems more easy, but few things are more difficult, than to look naturally at historical fact so as to see it just as it is. The power to do this is not a gift of nature, but a result of culture, and no race or nation has possessed it until it reached intellectual maturity." Isolated events were at first commemorated in inscriptions or by some other method, and thus we have funerary notices of great persons and copies of laws, treaties, alliances, etc. The growing needs of religious and political organization caused a development into regular lists containing the names of priests, kings or other officials, and these to the systematic recording of notable events, by means of chronicles arranged under regular periods. With the exception of the people of Israel, whose sacred writings contained a conception of human relations which was never applied to profane matters, none of the great nations of antiquity, the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Persians or the Chinese, notwithstanding the high degree of civilization to which they attained and notwithstanding the fact that they collected and arranged enormous lists of events, ever rose to any higher view of history than that which found expression in chronicles.

To Greece was reserved the honor of making the first step in advance, and of cultivating history for its own sake. The first exponent of the new trend in historical studies was Herodotus, whose purposes and plan are best expressed in his own words. "These are the researches of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, which he publishes in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of preventing the great and marvellous actions of the Greeks and the barbarians from losing their due meed of glory, and withal to put on record what were the grounds of their hostility." Herodotus, however, did not rid himself of epic ideas in narrating the connection and causes of incidents. He was a master of style and composition and an indefatigable investigator, but he lacked critical insight, and the power to analyse the working of natural causes and political forces. To his mind history was an interesting drama arranged by the gods and worked out according to laws determined by them.

Many of the faults and shortcomings of Herodotus were so completely avoided by Thucydides that it is almost inconceivable that they were contemporaries. Thucydides confined himself to a limited field of study in his account of the Peloponnesian war, and was able to investigate the course and current of events more closely than if his work was on a wider scale. He brought to the task, however, qualities of mind and judgment which give his work a unique charm and importance. He was thoroughly objective not only in his investigation of evidence but in his delineation of cause. He found the reasons for the movements he described in the nature, character and passions of the men who were the chief actors. Notwithstanding his objectivity and impartiality he could not avoid a tone of didacticism, and his work assumes a pragmatic character when he aims at telling "what has happened and will hereafter happen according to human nature." Thucydides had many faults but no superior among Greek historians in the carefulness with which he selected his materials and the profound insight he showed in explaining the causes and progress of the events he described.

The changes in the political horizon which took place in the century and a half after the death of Thucydides opened up new vistas to the historian. Alexander had gone through his marvellous career of conquest and Rome was gradually bringing the civilized world under her sway. A universalism in empire naturally led to a revolution in thought. With the spectacle of the widespread dominion of Rome before his eyes it is not surprising that Polybius, a Greek, who had lived in Rome and was acquainted with her constitution and laws should have undertaken to write a universal history in which he set forth the destiny of Rome to be mistress of the world. He found purely natural reasons to explain the events which he described, "but his whole view of history necessarily rendered him an apologist of accomplished facts, and of Roman success." With the wide field of Roman conquest spread before him, Polybius was able to deal with history on a more comprehensive scale than any of his predecessors, and notwithstanding his profound admiration for Roman genius, he was capable of sound objectivity in his judgment of causes. He could not, however, avoid the temptation nor override the prevailing tendency to be didactic and pragmatic.

Polybius had no successors. His work contained many ideas of profound import, he had a conception of universality remarkable in a historian of his time, but it was the result of observation rather than of reflection, and he developed no new lines of historical speculation. Rome herself found no child to depict her purpose nor her greatness. "No Latin author showed himself able even intelligently to continue what Polybius had begun. The Roman will made history universal, but the Roman intellect was deficient in the qualities requisite for treating successfully of universal history." The works of Sallust and Cæsar, though models of their kind and excellent literary vehicles for conveying the purposes of their authors, do not, because they fail to exhibit any profound ideas of historical philosophy, represent any advance in the development of historiography.

Roman historians were too much under the dominance of the spirit of didacticism, too much swayed by notions of patriot-

ism, to be capable of viewing events impartially and objectively. The practical purposes which were kept constantly in view blinded them to the real causes of the movements they described. The historian turned moralist and propagandist. Livy and Tacitus exhibit the merits and defects of this species of composition most strikingly. The former troubled himself not so much with facts as with effect. He aimed at arousing in the minds of his readers what he considered to be the genuine spirit of Rome, and possessing no depth of political philosophy, he frequently sacrificed accuracy to expediency. In a more pronounced degree than Livy Tacitus was absorbed by the spirit of didacticism. His historical writings are moral treatises, patriotic appeals in favor of Rome's declining greatness and denunciations of the vices which, since the time of Tiberius, were undermining the stability of the Empire and threatening its ruin.

With Tacitus Roman historiography or what is really worthy of the name, came to an end. Suetonius, and his successors down to the authors of the Augustan History, compiled interesting collections of anecdotes, but neither in form, in critical acumen nor in plan and scope do their works deserve to rank with those of the earlier writers. The historians of the second and third centuries, even with the evidence of Roman power and influence before their eyes, showed themselves utterly impervious to the lessons political and philosophical which might be deduced therefrom.

A survey of the characteristics of ancient historiography shows that while it exhibited many undoubted marks of excellence it had also many grave defects. While it excelled on the literary side, it lacked the critical spirit, the judicial quality which demands that decision should wait on fact and evidence. These faults are, however, largely technical. The real reason why the ancient authors failed to grasp or adequately to portray the true scope and purpose of history, was because they had no clear conception of the unity of the human race, and because they had no broad philosophical grasp of the reasons for progress and continuity in human events. Facts and their

relationships are the working materials of historians, and facts and their relationships are as wide as human society. Particular epochs and partial histories may be written, but their particular character, their character as parts of a whole must not be lost sight of. The people of antiquity never succeeded in freeing themselves intellectually from a narrow spirit of nationalism. They never conceived the idea of unity of race. The state was their ideal of society. They had no consciousness of the wider synthesis expressed by the term humanity. With these intellectual limitations, with their incapacity to see in the varying phenomena of human experience the results of manifold and far reaching causes, they never developed either a genetic concept of history or a real Philosophy of History.

Passing from the spirit of the ancient world as manifested in its historiography to the new ideas of human relations exhibited in the Christian religion, we find that history for the first time assumed a character which is usually designated as genetic. Christianity taught that distinctions of race and nationality could not obliterate the bonds of a common nature, it first laid down the principle of unity in society, and based its great social synthesis on belief in a common fate through the fall of Adam, of a common destiny to salvation in Christ, and a final judgment for all men before an eternal tribunal. Through this conception of the solidarity of mankind by descent from the same ancestors, and of society as composed of individuals with the same responsibility and the same destiny, history was enriched by a new standard for measuring human relations, and historiography received a new meaning and purpose.

"Christianity by creating the Church," says Flint, "enormously enlarged and enriched history. It thereby opened up a central and exhaustless vein in the mine of human affairs. The rise of ecclesiastical history was more to historiography than was the discovery of America to geography. It added immensely to the contents of history and radically changed men's conceptions of its nature. It at once caused political history to be seen to be only a part of history, and carried even into the popular mind the conviction—of which hardly a trace

is to be found in the classic historians—that all history must move towards some general human end, and some divine goal.”

Such a conception of history was inseparable from the Christian dogmas of the Fall and Redemption of mankind and a necessary corollary to the Christian scheme of world evangelization. It is needless to say that neither the scientific application of the new theory of history nor the formulation of a systematic Philosophy was a necessary duty either of the theologian or the evangelist. Historiography exhibits the needs as well as the ideals of its framers, and though the historical impulse in Christianity found expression from the very beginning, centuries elapsed before any adequate exemplification was given either of the conception of history or the Philosophy of History, contained in Christian dogma. To Eusebius of Cæsarea belongs the honor of first applying the new principles in narrating the course of events and to Augustine of Hippo that of formulating the first philosophy of History.

A mere enumeration of the historical works of Eusebius is not possible here, nor would it give any clue to the range and quality of his learning. He lived at a critical period in the life of the church, when all the hostile forces, political and intellectual, which had been gathering through three centuries were bursting over the Christian organization. “His lot was cast,” as has been said by one of his admirers, “in the great crisis of transition. He stood as it were on the frontier line between two ages, with one foot in the Hellenism of the past and the other in the Christianity of the future; and by his very position he was constrained to view them face to face and to discuss their mutual relations.” All the charges and objections against the Christian religion were gradually reduced, in the assaults of such men as Porphyry, to one fundamental argument, the Christians had no history. No race had grown to greatness in the worship of the God they adored. He had not shown Himself in nature nor in history. If He had created men, what was to be said of His Providence, and how was it that His name was unknown in antiquity? With such assailants and living in such times it was natural that

the work of Eusebius should have assumed an apologetic character. The duties imposed on him, however, as an apologist never blinded Eusebius to the duties of the historian, but serve rather to bring out his thorough impartiality and his deep-seated conviction that a frank appeal to the past was the surest support of the convictions for which he contended.

The History of the Church is the work by which Eusebius is best known. "Had he written nothing else," says McGiffert, "Eusebius' Church History would have made him immortal; for if immortality be a fitting reward for large and lasting services, few possess a clearer title to it than the author of this work." Despite the many shortcomings of this indispensable volume, there runs through it the idea of unity and humanity, a conviction that all men are to be absorbed into the kingdom of Christ, and that under the spirit of the gospel a society will be established wide as humanity itself. The Church History, however, is merely a section of the great plan conceived by Eusebius, and the exhibition of but one phase in the great designs of Providence which had been operative from the beginning and which would direct human destiny to the end. A more complete expression of his conception of the course of human events is found in other writings, notably those entitled *Prophetical Extracts*, *Praeparatio Evangelica* and *Demonstratio Evangelica*. The theme of these works has been well described as "God in History." The author points out that the progress of Christianity, its growth through conversions among the gentiles and its failure to attract the Jews had been foretold in the pages of the prophets. The work on which the claim of Eusebius to be a pioneer and founder in methods of history is the *Chronicle* or "*Divers Histories*." It is divided into two books, the first containing an epitome of history, the second a series of "chronological tables, which exhibit in parallel columns the succession of the rulers of different nations, in such a way that the reader can see at a glance with whom any given monarch was contemporary. And they are accompanied by notes marking the years of some of the more remarkable historical events, these notes also constituting an epitome of history."

These are but a few of the words of Eusebius. "He was historian, apologist, topographer, exegete, critic, preacher, dogmatic writer in turn." It mattered nothing, however, what subject he touched, the thought which found expression in all his writings was that Jesus Christ was the centre of the world's history. All the vicissitudes in the fortunes of the human race are but the development of a divine plan to rescue men from the abyss of misery into which they had been plunged by original sin. The varied story of human experience was coördinated into one vast whole by Eusebius in the three great concepts of humanity, progress and liberty, which, if not explicitly designated, are nevertheless represented as potent factors in human development. Compared with the plan of Eusebius the universal history of Polybius or the ancients is seen to be merely a partial or particularist conception. In the mind of Eusebius one plan ran through history. It began with Adam, it centred in Christ and closed with the general judgment. Compared to such a plan the schemes of the classical authors sink into insignificance. Instead of the tribe or the state or the nation history was made to embrace the vicissitudes of humanity at large and of society as a whole.

On the purely technical side the work of Eusebius exhibits many defects. He was frequently uncritical, he erred in matters of chronology, and his work exhibits none of the literary finish and fine appreciation of effective grouping and description which are shown in his classical predecessors, but in earnestness to acquaint himself with reliable sources, in calm objective discrimination and in intellectual honesty, his work opens up a new period in the history of historiography.

Eusebius had many imitators. Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret contented themselves with continuing the history of the church from where he left off. And throughout the middle ages as at the present time, his works are a unique guide to the early days of Christianity.

The successful application of the principles of Christianity to the subject of history by Eusebius did not save the followers of Christ from fresh reproaches less than a century later when

the city of Rome was captured by the Visigoths. It is hard to conceive the consternation of the pagans and even of the Christians, when the fact dawned on them that Rome, after more than eleven hundred years of conquest and supremacy, was in the hands of her enemies. The heathens attributed the calamity to Christianity, and claimed it was a punishment for abandoning the worship of the national deities. St. Augustine devoted thirteen years to the composition of a work, the "*De Civitate Dei*," to repel these accusations. His plan and purpose are best stated in his own words. "This work was in my hands for several years, owing to the interruptions occasioned by many other affairs which had a prior claim on my attention, and which I could not defer. However, this great undertaking was at last completed in twenty-two books. Of these the first five refute those who fancy that polytheistic worship is necessary in order to secure worldly prosperity, and that all these overwhelming calamities have befallen us in consequence of its prohibition. In the following five books I address myself to those who admit that such calamities have at all times attended and will at all times attend the human race and that they constantly recur in forms more or less disastrous, varying only in the scenes, occasions and persons on whom they light, but, while admitting this, maintain that the worship of the gods is advantageous for the life to come. In these ten books, then, I refute these two opinions, which are as groundless as they are antagonistic to the Christian religion. But that no one might have occasion to say, that though I had refuted the tenets of other men, I had omitted to establish my own, I devote to this object the second part of this work, which comprises twelve books although I have not scrupled, as occasion offered, either to advance my own opinions in the first ten books or to demolish the arguments of my opponents in the last twelve. Of these twelve books, the first four contain an account of the origin of these two cities,—the city of God and the city of the world. The second four treat of their history or progress; the third and last four of their deserved destinies. And so, though all these twenty-two books refer to both cities,

yet I have named them after the better city and called them The City of God."

Such was the magnificent phenomena of universal history which passed before the mind of St. Augustine. Every incident and every movement had its allotted place, and the entire course of human events moved along in a stately and orderly procession. It was Christian Theology vitalized and embodied in the story of the nations. Nothing was left to chance or caprice. With a wealth of detail and a world of dialectic St. Augustine depicted the course of history, commencing with the rebellion of the angels in Paradise, and the fall of man less than six thousand years before, and pointed out its future course in foreordained channels until time should be no more. The *Civitas Terrena* or *Diaboli* was established with man's first disobedience. Though all men as descended from the same parents, shared in their sin, "God who has not left even the entrails of the smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of a bird, or the little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, without an harmony, and, as it were, a mutual peace among all its parts, can never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside of the laws of His Providence." Nothing was left to chance or to fate, and without impairing man's freedom of will, everything was foreordained by God. Notwithstanding differences of race and nation and institutions there are only two kinds of society, "the one consists of those who wish to live after the flesh, the other of those who wish to live after the spirit." Cain was the founder and first citizen of the *Civitas Diaboli*: the just are the citizens of the *Civitas Dei*. Like the individual the race had to pass through its period of preparation and education. The history of man had two great epochs, the time of preparation before Christ, and the time of triumph afterwards. All the great states of antiquity were under the dominion of Satan and passed away: but in the appointed time Christ came to re-establish the kingdom of God, represented thenceforth by the Church. The victory of the Church was the purpose of history, and the triumph of the City of God the purpose of

human existence. Once again in the last days Anti-Christ would come and struggle for mastery only to be subdued. This long drama would end at the last judgment, when those of the City of God would be rewarded with eternal happiness and the children of sin would be condemned to eternal woe.

Nothing pertaining to human welfare on earth has been left out of this picture. It exhibited the vicissitudes of times and peoples and explained them all as results of clearly defined causes. Here, for the first time, was expounded a comprehensive and systematic scheme, broad as the universal history of the race and bounded only by the Creation and the Last Judgment, in which was set forth not only the current and progress of events, but the underlying causes from which they flowed and by which they were directed.

"With all its defects," says Flint, "it was a vast improvement on previous theories of history, or rather on the previous want of a theory. It explicitly affirmed the historical unity and progress which to some extent it denied. It recognized the importance of the moral and spiritual in the life and movement of humanity. It represented history as one great whole guided by principles and proceeding to solemn issues through an orderly series of stages. It made apparent that the knowledge of history bears closely on the highest problems of speculation."

As a presentation of the Christian view of history the work of St. Augustine has never been surpassed. It dominated the entire Middle Ages, reappears in Bossuet's *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, and forms the substance of Treatises by De Maistre, Görres and Rougemont in later times.

At the suggestion of St. Augustine, a Spanish priest, Orosius, composed a universal history (*Libri vii Historiarum adversus Paganos*) to refute the same charges dealt with in "The City of God," and embodying in practical form the principles which the latter was intended to expound.

Augustine and Orosius had scarcely ended their labors before the pall of Teutonic invasion fell on Western Europe. The Empire was settled by new peoples having no bonds with the

past nor sympathy for its culture. Whatever remained of the old civilization was guarded by the Church, which undertook the task of teaching the invaders. Historical science was slow in emerging from the universal disorder, and when it did appear it bore few marks of continuity with the achievements of Eusebius and Augustine. The period between the Gothic and Vandal conquests down to the Renaissance was, however, rich in an ever-increasing output of historical writing. In this vast mass of literature there were few works, even on ecclesiastical history, of a general character. The *Breviarium Historiae Ecclesiasticae* of Haymo of Halberstadt (853), the *Historia Ecclesiastica* of Anastasius Bibliothecarius (886), of Ordericus Vitalis, the *Flores Chronicorum* of Bernard Guido and the general histories of Bartholomaeus de Fiadonibus or of the Dominican Antoninus were merely summaries of older works or so uncritical and inexact, except when they occasionally dealt with contemporary events, as to be practically worthless.

In the histories of particular peoples or of national churches the Middle Ages produced real monuments of historical information. Among these may be enumerated the works of Jordanis, Gregory of Tours, the Venerable Bede and the works of Adam of Bremen and Flodoard of Rheims. It is not too much to say that we owe most of our knowledge regarding certain periods of Gothic, Frankish, English and Scandinavian history to the writings of these men and that, notwithstanding their many shortcomings, the information contained in their pages is in the main correct.

The great mass of mediaeval historical writings is in the form of Biographies, Annals and Chronicles dealing with the lives of saints, popes or bishops or with the histories of monasteries or bishoprics. Notwithstanding their ecclesiastical character they deal freely with secular affairs, as the Middle Ages knew little of the distinction between profane and secular history. The works enumerated by Wattenbach, Potthast, Chevalier and the Bollandists all contain with few exceptions the same general principles of historiography and all exhibit the same tendencies in method. This does not mean that the Middle Ages produced no great historians. Most critics single

out for special praise Otto of Freisingen who exhibited conceptions as large and comprehensive as those of Augustine. Adam of Bremen failed of being known as the Herodotus of the North only because he did not write in the vernacular. To go over the list of those who deserve special praise would serve no good purpose as mediaeval historiography remained within limits which from the circumstances of the time it was unable to escape.

As a general rule few works of mediaeval historians give evidence of any desire on the part of the authors to become acquainted with all the facts. Europe recovered slowly from the prostration of the Teutonic invasions and until the era of the Crusades, there was no possibility of gaining access to the sources of history. The foundation of the Universities and contact with the East broadened the mental horizon of Western Europe and opened up channels of information until then closed. In addition the mediaeval students had little critical training in dealing with facts and the kind of evidence presented to historians. They were not trained in the methods of induction and troubled themselves little about generalization from particulars. They did not, however, lack guiding principles in dealing with history. The faith which ruled their lives saved them from anarchistic tendencies and new, unproved theories. In all that went to make up a solid conception of history, and in the possession of principles implicitly at least forming a sound Philosophy of History, the baldest mediaeval chronicle immeasurably surpassed the classical works of antiquity.

Compared with ancient historiography, therefore, that of the Middle Ages suffers on the side of presentation. It produced no Thucydides and no Tacitus. It was, on the other hand, in its higher forms no less critical than the works of pagan antiquity, and it never lost its grasp on fundamental principles regarding the unity, the progress and the ultimate betterment of the race as being consonant with the divine plans which saved humanity from the results of its own folly and was guiding it to a higher destiny.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

WHY INTEREST IS PAID.

Why does the man who borrows a hundred dollars pay back at the end of the year, not simply the hundred dollars which he has borrowed, but also, say five dollars in addition? Why does he pay interest? The obvious answer is that he cannot get the money otherwise. But why does he wish to get the money upon such onerous terms? Is he not worse off at the end of the year when he has paid back the hundred five dollars than he would be if he had not borrowed the money in the first place? What is the source from which the extra five dollars comes?

To this last question a great many different kinds of answers have been given, but the discussion has not yet been closed. Aristotle condemned interest taking on the ground that money is naturally barren. Any bright school boy will point out that Aristotle's mistake lay in not seeing that money can be used to purchase productive capital, and that, therefore, money is virtually productive. The socialists are on the side of Aristotle and against the school boy. They hold that it is not true that capital is productive of interest. Labor, they say, produces the whole product. The capitalist, in the manner of a refined highwayman, is in possession of an instrument which enables him to appropriate to himself the product of the labor of others. And some of them go on to contend that all interest taking is morally wrong. Henry George goes to the other extreme, in defense of the schoolboy's position, and holds that the true source of interest is the natural productivity of capital. "Thus interest springs from the power of increase which the reproductive forces of nature, and the in effect analogous capacity for exchange, give to capital. It is not an arbitrary, but a natural thing; it is not the result of a particular social organization, but of the laws of the universe which underlie society. It is, therefore, just." The economists, for the most part, are

inclined to think that the true source of interest has been found neither by Henry George nor by the socialists. Interest is neither exploitation of labor nor simply the result of the productive and reproductive forces of nature.

Let us first examine Henry George's contention. "It is true," says George, "that if I put away money, it will not increase. But suppose, instead, I put away wine. At the end of a year I will have an increased value, for the wine will have improved in quality. Or supposing that in a country adapted to them, I set out bees; at the end of a year I will have more swarms of bees, and the honey which they have made. Or, supposing, where there is a range, I turn out sheep or hogs or cattle; at the end of the year I will, upon the average, also have an increase.

"Now what gives the increase in these cases is something which, though it generally requires labor to utilize it, is yet distinct and separable from labor—the active power of nature; the principle of growth, of reproduction, which everywhere characterizes all the forms of that mysterious thing or condition which we call life. And it seems to me that it is this which is the cause of interest, or the increase of capital over and above that due to labor. There are, so to speak, in the movements which make up the everlasting flux of nature, certain vital currents, which will, if we use them, aid us, with a force independent of our own efforts, in turning matter into the forms we desire—that is to say, into wealth. . . .

"If I plant and care for a tree until it comes to maturity, I receive, in its fruit, interest upon the capital I have thus accumulated—that is, the labor I have expended. If I raise a cow, the milk which she yields me morning and evening is not merely the reward of the labor then exerted; but interest upon the capital which my labor, expended in raising her, has accumulated in the cow. And so, if I use my own capital in directly aiding production, as by machinery, or indirectly aiding production, in exchange, I receive a special and distinguishable advantage from the reproductive character of the capital, which is as real, though perhaps not as clear, as though I had lent my capital to another and he had paid me interest."

At first sight, George seems to have established a good case. On reflection, it is found too good to be true. In the first place, interest can be had for the use of capital where the productive and reproductive forces of nature are not at work, as well as where they are at work. Thus when the carpenter uses a plane, in George's opinion, labor alone is the efficient cause of production. If the farmer buys a calf at the beginning of the year, on the other hand, he will have a cow at the end of the year. Here the vital forces of nature are at work. And yet interest can be had upon investments in planes as well as upon investments in calves. George tries to get around this difficulty by saying that there is an averaging up of benefits, and that the capital invested in the plane must get as high a rate of return as the capital invested in the calf; otherwise, capital would be invested only where natural forces were at work. But he does not give a satisfactory explanation as to why the owner of a thing which will give a return on account of the coöperation of nature should be willing to exchange his property for a thing which does not receive any gratuitous assistance from nature, but which gives a return only in proportion to the labor employed upon it.

In the second place, George seems to say that as the calf becomes a cow, the increase is due entirely to the forces of nature. But the owner of a herd of cattle will find that the increase of the herd from year to year does not represent a net interest return, but that there are heavy outlays in the form of wages. If this natural increase cannot be obtained except by the expenditure of wages for laborers, it is evident that the whole of the increase cannot be accounted interest. Where, then, is the dividing line between interest and wages, even in those cases where nature seems to be responsible for the increase? Is it not possible that the whole of the natural increase of the herd might be required to pay the wages of the laborers? And if so, should we not have a case where nature aids in production, but where there is no interest? Or again, might the situation not be such that although the herd had grown ten per cent. in numbers, the value of the herd was not greater

than before? Thus, ten head of cattle this year, might be as valuable as eleven head next year. In that case, although nature had done her work perfectly, there would be no increase of capital from one year to another, and hence no interest; for interest represents an increase in value, rather than an increase in the number or size of physical goods. Or suppose, on the other hand, that the herd did not increase physically, through the year, but that on account of an increased demand, the prices went up and that ten head of cattle were worth ten per cent. more this year than last. Why would not the increased value due to the increased demand, represent interest as truly as if there had been an increased value due entirely to an increase in physical growth?

George has made the solution of the problem far too simple. Take for instance, his illustration of the wine which is put away for a year, and which increases in value. He supposes that it is a simple matter of addition to find out the value of the wine at the beginning of the year, and a simple matter of subtraction to take this amount from the value of the wine at the end of the year, and that the remainder is interest on the capital for the year. But the problem does not work out so simply. The wine has not value at the beginning of the year because it has cost something to produce it. It has value at the beginning of the year because it is going to have value at the end of the year. It has value because it can be consumed, and will satisfy a want. The undertaking to pay expenses of production, such as wages, or rent, or interest, does not give value to the product. But a good business man will not undertake to pay more rent and interest and wages than is warranted by the value of the product. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, the cost of production depends upon the value of the product, instead of the value of the product depending upon costs of production. The value of a commodity depends upon the usefulness of the article (the term usefulness is here employed without moral connotation), and its scarcity. It is true that the scarcity of the article may be depend upon the effort required to produce it, and in this indirect way also, value is

related to cost of production. If the wine were a commodity which had no present usefulness, independently of its usefulness at the end of the year, and if there were no other expenses in connection with keeping it through the year except the interest expense, our method of procedure would be first to find out the value which the commodity would have at the end of the year, on account of its usefulness and its scarcity, and then to find out the rate of interest, and after discounting the value at the end of the year at this rate, we should arrive at the value at the beginning of the year. In other words, we do not get any new knowledge by subtracting the value at the beginning of the year from the value at the end of the year, for the reason that we must have known the rate of interest, before we could find the value at the beginning of the year.

A parallel situation is seen in the rate of return upon an investment in land. Suppose that we invest a hundred thousand dollars in real estate and get a return of five thousand dollars a year. Our first thought might be that it is remarkable that this land returns us five per cent. on our investment, and that the same or nearly the same *rate* of return is given by land much poorer than ours as well as by land much more fertile. When we stop to think the matter over, however, we realize that the case is not nearly so remarkable as it seemed at first sight. Our land is worth a hundred thousand dollars because the rate of interest is five per cent. The rate of interest is not five per cent. because our land is worth a hundred thousand dollars. The value of the land comes from the value of the annual product of the land. The value of this annual product depends upon its usefulness and its scarcity. Given the value of the annual return from the land, we find the value of the land itself, by capitalizing it at the current rate of interest. The annual return is five thousand dollars. We capitalize this at the current rate of five per cent., and we obtain for the value of the land, a hundred thousand dollars. If through some changes in the usefulness or scarcity of the product of the land, its annual value should change to ten thousand dollars, the value of the land itself, would likewise be doubled. No

change in the rate of interest would result. Or suppose that the causes which determine the current rate of interest undergo a change such that the rate of interest becomes ten per cent. instead of five. The value of the land would then be cut in half. Thus the value of the land is a *result* of the rate of interest and the annual income, rather than a *cause*. In like manner, the present value of wine which I put away until next year for the purpose of improvement, depends upon next year's value and upon the rate of interest. It is not a cause of the rate of interest. Similar reasoning might be applied to the other examples given by Henry George to illustrate the cause of interest. It is clear that George has not found the real cause of interest.

The socialist explanation of interest goes to the other extreme. Henry George says that interest is paid because of the contribution which nature makes to the productive process. The socialists say that labor is the only active agent in production. Labor uses capital in working upon the land. Capital and land are passive while labor produces. The whole value produced is the product of labor. But since labor needs capital in order to work effectively, the owner of capital is able to compel labor to give him a portion of the value which it has produced. It is as though the capitalist had erected a turnstile upon a bridge which had been built by labor. If labor wishes to cross the bridge, it must pay the capitalist the toll. This theory of value was worked out with much ingenuity by Karl Marx, "the father of scientific socialism." Marx's philosophy was deterministic. According to him, men's actions are all controlled by the iron grip of fate. What is going to be, is going to be, and that is the end of it. It would not do for him to say that interest taking is wrong, because to the determinist there is no right and wrong. The worst that Marx could logically say was that interest taking is uneconomic. He believed, however, that it would prove to be a machine which would ultimately overturn society and set up the socialistic state. Some of his disciples, less logical than he, say that since labor has produced the whole product, the whole product *ought*

to go to labor. Some of them even allege that Marx himself considered interest taking immoral. If he ever said so, it was a slip of his pen and was not a position which he could have held upon reflection. The present day socialist, however, bears the chains of logic more lightly, and when he protests that interest taking is exploitation of labor, he means that it is a shame and a disgrace to our civilization and that it *ought* to be stopped, because it is wrong. In two sentences he says: Labor produces the whole product. Therefore, labor ought to receive the whole product. The error of the socialists is similar to that of Henry George. The value of the product does not depend upon the value of the things which produce it. On the contrary, the value of the product depends upon the usefulness of the product and upon its scarcity. The value of the labor and of the other things which go to produce the commodity, are derived from the value of the product. If a commodity is worth a dollar, it cannot be made worth two dollars by putting two dollars' worth of work into it. It can be made worth two dollars only through an increased demand, or through a diminution of the supply, or both, assuming that the value of a dollar does not change in the meantime. When the commodity was worth a dollar, the sum of the rent and interest and wages and profits paid in its production, was a dollar, and when it becomes worth two dollars, the increased value is reflected back to the productive agents until their values represent the capitalization of two dollars instead of one. On the other hand, an inefficient employer may employ twice as much labor in the production of a commodity as is employed by a more competent rival, but he does not thereby obtain twice as high a price for the commodity. However important, therefore, we may consider labor as an agent in production (and it is hardly possible to overestimate its importance), the theory of the exploitation of labor does not furnish the true explanation of interest.

In the earlier half of the nineteenth century, the view was very much more common among economists than at the present time, that the value of a commodity is determined by the expense of producing it. Since interest represented a part of,

or was taken out of the value of the commodity, various efforts were made to determine the necessary service for which it was a recompense. One of the most important of these was that of Nassau William Senior. Senior realized that in the formation of capital abstention from consumption of goods was required. This abstinence was for the most part unpleasant, and in order that a sufficient amount of it be practiced so that any considerable amount of capital might be provided, it was necessary that those who saved should be rewarded for their self-sacrifice. Interest was, in the opinion of Senior, this necessary payment. Although this represented a distinct advance over the prevailing economic theory of the day, the phrase, wages of abstinence, which he employed, was not a happy one. It left plenty of room for the socialist Lassalle's sarcastic comment: "The profit of capital is the 'wage of abstinence.' Happy, even priceless expression! The ascetic millionaires of Europe! Like Indian penitents or pillar saints they stand: on one leg, each on his column, with straining arms and pendulous body and pallid looks, holding a plate towards the people to collect the wages of their abstinence. In their midst, towering up above all his fellows, as head penitent and ascetic, the Baron Rothschild! This is the condition of society! How could I ever so much misunderstand it!" If Senior were working out this line of reasoning today, he would undoubtedly take more care to show that interest is the wage of "marginal" abstinence. He would probably undertake to show that not all saving of a given amount of capital is the result of the same amount of sacrifice, but that it is the saving of the capital which is actually saved at the greatest sacrifice which determines the rate of interest. Had he done so he would have had about as good an interest theory as was possible for one who clung to the expense-of-production explanation of value.

The brilliant Austrian economist, Professor Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, broke new ground for interest theory in his "Positive Theory of Capital." He advanced the view that interest is paid because most of us prefer present goods to future goods of the like kind and number. This is usually called the agio

theory. Professor Irving Fisher of Yale, taking Böhm-Bawerk's theory as a starting point, while rejecting certain essential features, holds that the true explanation of interest is to be found in "impatience" to consume income. "It is odd," says Professor Fisher, "that no one has happened heretofore to hit on this term, which seems to be the only one expressing accurately and in a single word, the real basis of interest. The term *delay* (*mora*) was used by some medieval writers, who first sought to excuse interest taking on the ground that repayment of a loan was 'delayed' and that the delay should be penalized; but the justification of interest consists not exactly in the delay in paying, but in the fact that the borrower *does not like the delay*. The term 'abstinence' has had much currency; but it is not abstinence but the *inconvenience* of abstinence which is the real factor. By Professor Marshall the term 'waiting' has been suggested; but it is not the waiting which is significant but the reluctance to wait. Böhm-Bawerk's term 'agio' has attracted much attention; but it has no evident meaning until it is explained by a longer phrase—*i. e.*, 'a premium in the esteem of man for present over future goods.' The idea which it is sought to express by all these proposed terms—delay, abstinence, waiting, agio, as well as by other more clumsy expressions such as 'labor of saving,'—is simply the very familiar one expressed in daily experience by the term 'impatience.' It is because a man is impatient that he thinks 'delay' should be penalized; it is because he is impatient that 'abstinence' from immediate indulgence or 'waiting' for future indulgence, is regarded with disfavor; it is because he is impatient that he puts a premium or 'agio' on present goods as compared with future. . . . Impatience is a fundamental attribute of human nature. As long as people like to have things today rather than tomorrow, there will be a rate of interest. *Interest is, as it were, impatience crystallized into a market rate.*" (*The Impatience Theory of Interest*, p. 9.)

Professor Fisher's real contribution consists in his carefully working out the details of Böhm-Bawerk's theory. Where he departs from his predecessor's explanation by denying the im-

portance of the technical superiority of present over future goods, he weakens rather than strengthens his theory. Let us first examine the manner in which he works out the rate of interest and then consider the shortcomings of his theory.

The rate of interest is, according to Professor Fisher, a composite of the rates of impatience in the minds of different people. The rate of impatience in the individual's mind, is his preference for an additional dollar or dollar's worth of goods, available today, over an additional dollar or dollar's worth of goods, available a year from today. If, in order to get one dollar today, a man is willing to pay a dollar and five cents next year, his rate or degree of impatience is five per cent. The present dollar is worth so much to him that he is willing to pay for it five per cent. more than one dollar in the future; it is the willingness to do this to gratify one's impatience which causes the phenomenon of a rate of interest.

When present capital is preferred to future capital, the preference is really a preference for the income of the first capital as compared with the income of the second capital. The reason why we would choose a present fruit tree rather than a similar fruit tree available in ten years, is that the fruit of the first will be available earlier than that of the second. Impatience for goods of any kind resolves itself into impatience for income, *i. e.*, preference for immediate income over remote income.

The more impatient a people are, the higher will be their rate of interest, while the more patient they are, the lower will be their rate, according to Professor Fisher. The degree of impatience of the nation depends upon the degree of impatience of its individuals. This depends upon the character of the individuals and the character of their incomes. Five characteristics of the individual are considered in relation to their influence upon impatience, *viz.*, foresight, self-control, habit, expectation of life, and love for posterity. Generally speaking, the greater the foresight, the less the impatience, and *vice versa*. Similarly with self-control. One's habits also affect one's rate of impatience. Thus the rich man's son who has been

brought up with expensive habits, when he finds himself with a smaller income than his father provided him during his formative years, will be more impatient for income than a man who has this same income but who has climbed up instead of down. A man who looks forward to a long life will have a relatively high appreciation of the future, which means a relatively low appreciation of the present, and consequently a low rate of impatience. The most powerful cause tending to reduce the rate of interest is love for one's children and the desire to provide for them. Life insurance is acting as one of the most powerful means of lowering the rate of impatience and therefore the rate of interest.

The rate of impatience of the individual depends not only upon his own character but also upon the character of his income. If his present income is large while his expected future income is small, he will have a low rate of impatience and *vice versa*. Thus, the young professional man with small income but with great expectations, is likely not only to live up to his present income, but to intrench largely upon his future income through borrowing, while the man with a descending income will prefer to save and lend a part of his present income in order not to be compelled to lower too greatly his standard of living in the future.

The absolute amount of income as well as its distribution in time, has an influence upon the individual's rate of impatience. The smaller the income, the higher will be the rate of impatience. This will be true for two reasons. In the first place, with a small income there will be greater need to use the whole income and to draw on the future in order to keep alive. In the second place, poverty tends to distort the perspective. Its effect is to relax foresight and self-control, and to tempt one to trust to luck for the future, if only the all-absorbing clamor of present necessities may thus be satisfied.

Another important influence on impatience is uncertainty of income. In general uncertainty of income tends to raise the rate of impatience. Thus sailors are proverbial spendthrifts and have a proverbially high degree of impatience because of their

constant risk of life and the consequent uncertainty of next year's income. There are, however, exceptional cases where the uncertainty of future income has the opposite effect, *viz.*, that of lowering the degree of impatience, as where it causes people to lay up something for a rainy day.

Thus, to sum up, where the income is small, increasing and precarious, and where the recipient of the income is short-sighted, weak-willed, accustomed to spend, and without heirs, the degree of impatience will be very large. On the other hand, the degree of impatience will be extremely small where all the opposite circumstances are present, *i. e.*, where the income is large, decreasing and assured, and where the recipient is far-sighted, self-controlled, accustomed to save, and desirous to provide for heirs. Between these extremes are individuals whose characters or the character of whose incomes are in some respects favorable to a low degree of impatience and in other respects favorable to a high degree of impatience. The actual rate of interest will be determined by the combination of all these various rates of preference for present income. Thus, suppose that a man's degree of impatience, *i. e.*, rate of preference, is ten per cent. This means that he is willing to sacrifice one dollar and ten cents of next year's income in exchange for one dollar of this year's. But in the market he may be able to obtain one dollar this year by sacrificing only one dollar and five cents of next year's income. This is to him a cheap rate of interest. Accordingly, he borrows a hundred dollars at five per cent. when he would have been willing to pay ten. This loan, by increasing his present income and decreasing his future, tends to reduce his rate of impatience from ten per cent. to, say, eight per cent. He will continue to borrow another and another hundred dollars until his present income is so large in proportion to his future income that his rate of impatience is reduced to the market rate of interest. At this point he will stop borrowing. On the other hand, an individual with a rate of impatience of two per cent. will become a lender instead of a borrower. He will be willing to accept a hundred and two dollars of next year's income for

one hundred dollars of this year's, but in the market he is able to get one hundred five dollars instead of one hundred two. As he can lend at five per cent. when he would be willing to lend at two per cent., he invests not merely one hundred dollars but several hundred. As he reduced his present income by lending additional hundreds and increases his future income, he raises his rate of impatience. When his rate of impatience reaches the market rate of interest, he will not lend more.

For the individual, the market rate of interest seems to be a fixed fact, but for society as a whole the rate of interest is simply the rate of impatience upon which the whole community may agree. If the rate of interest were fixed very high, there would be relatively many lenders and few borrowers. If the rate were fixed very low, there would be many borrowers and few lenders. The rate must be fixed at a point where the loan market will be cleared. Supply and demand will work this out.

So much for the statement of Professor Fisher's theory. It is an improvement upon the exploitation theory of the socialists inasmuch as it shows that interest is a natural phenomenon having its basis in the desire of men to enjoy next year's income now rather than next year. Or as Böhm-Bawerk puts it: "The perfectly just proposition that the laborer should receive the entire value of his product may be understood to mean either that the laborer should *now* receive the entire *present* value of his product, or should receive the entire *future* value of his product *in the future*. But Rodbertus and the socialists expound it as if it meant that the laborer should *now* receive the entire *future* value of his product." As long as men place different estimates upon present goods and future goods of like quality and number, upon present income and the same income in the future interest will be paid. Interest is, therefore, not necessarily exploitation.

The impatience theory is likewise a decided improvement upon the crude productivity theory of Henry George. George would have it that interest is due to the fact that capital is "naturally" productive. But it is clear that in a community

producing without capital, there would be a desire on the part of many to consume next year's income this year, and this would give rise to interest. And even in actually existing society interest would arise among those whose incomes are in no wise the result of what George would consider productive capital. Even where we have productive capital, in the Georgian sense, as where wine is put away and increases in value, the impatience explanation is far more satisfactory than that advanced by Henry George. Wines which cannot be used this year to good advantage but which will be ready for consumption next year, would this year have the value which it is to have next year except for the inconvenience of waiting—except for the impatience of the owners to place it upon the market or their impatience to consume it. The greater this impatience, the smaller is the present value of the wine.

Is the impatience theory of interest, then, an entirely satisfactory explanation of the causes of interest? Yes and no. Yes, inasmuch as it gives a perfectly logical explanation of interest without the need of assuming capital productivity, and because the assumption of capital productivity alone is not a sufficient explanation of the cause of interest. No, because impatience for present income being taken for granted, capital productivity is a real further cause of interest. Thus, for example, when men can use capital productively, more of them will be on the borrowing side of the market; they will be more desirous of having next year's income now in order to use it in production, and hence their impatience rates will be increased and this will have a tendency to increase the rate of interest.

In my opinion, Professor Fisher really admits this when he says, (*Principles*, p. 400): "Of the remaining three determining conditions," (*i. e.*, determining the rate of interest) "the most important may be stated in the following form: Of all the optional uses to which a man may put his capital he will choose, that one which at the market rate of interest makes the present value of his capital the largest possible. . . . Thus the farmer's decision as to which of the optional uses of his

capital is the best will depend, in part, on the rate of interest. Reciprocally, the rate of interest in the community will depend in part on the choice of uses of capital," etc. Since increased product usually—though not always—means increased value, there is here an implicit recognition of an influence exerted by the productivity of capital upon the rate of interest.

As thus amended, *i. e.*, to admit of the influence of the productivity of capital upon the rate of interest, the impatience theory differs little if at all from the "marginal productivity" theory which at present enjoys a wide popularity among economists. The difference between the two becomes merely a question as to where the emphasis shall be placed. This is not, indeed, the view taken by Professor Seager of Columbia who is inclined to place the two theories in sharp contrast. In a criticism of the impatience theory (*American Economic Review*, December, 1912), he says: "To the author's (Professor Fisher's) final conclusion that 'the idea of raising the rate of interest by increasing the productivity of capital is, therefore, like the idea of raising one's self by one's boot straps,' I can only reply that to my mind the idea of raising the rate of interest in any other way is like increasing the volume of a stream by changes, not in the capacities of its source or tributaries but in the ocean into which it flows." But Professor Seager himself most certainly recognizes that there are other ways of raising the rate of interest than by increasing the physical productivity of capital. And even the increase in "marginal" productivity can not in any very real sense be called an increase in the productivity of capital.

Perhaps I ought to explain for the benefit of the uninitiated that this marginal productivity theory has little or almost nothing in common with the crude productivity theory of Henry George. The limits of the present paper will not admit of more than a brief and very unsatisfactory statement of it. According to the marginal productivity theory, the owner of capital receives for its use what it produces at the margin of production. He does not receive the whole product of all his capital, for that would be impossible to estimate. Thus, if

there is employed in a given business capital to the amount of a thousand dollars a part of the whole output of the business is due to the presence of the capital. Suppose the whole output for a given period is worth a hundred dollars. Now if the whole capital of one thousand dollars were removed from the business probably the output would be nothing. But we cannot say that the whole hundred dollars' worth of output is produced by the capital. There have been other factors at work and part of the result is due to them. Nor can we say how much of the hundred dollars' worth has been produced by the capital. Suppose, however, that instead of withdrawing the thousand dollars' worth of capital from the business we withdraw only one dollar's worth, leaving an investment of nine hundred ninety-nine dollars. The result of withdrawing the one dollar's worth of capital will not be that one-thousandth of the total output for the period, or ten cents' worth, will disappear. The loss will be very much smaller than this fraction. Suppose that the loss due to the absence of the "marginal" dollar's worth of capital is three cents. Three cents, then, is the marginal product of the capital, and it represents not only the importance of the presence of the marginal dollar's worth of capital in the business but the importance of the presence of any dollar's worth of capital which is actually used in the business. Under these circumstances the interest on a dollar for the given period will be practically three cents. If the period is one year the *rate* of interest will be three per cent. Interest is the marginal product of capital. It is not the specific physical share of the output which capital has produced.

Assuming that these two theories are not inharmonious and that taken together they explain why interest is paid, do they justify interest taking? No, that is not their purpose. But one must have a satisfactory idea of why interest is paid before one is in a position to take up the matter of the justification of interest taking.

FRANK O'HARA.

THE DEVOTIONAL ELEMENT IN MISSIONARY WORK.

"All the logic in the world would not have made me move faster towards Rome than I did," writes Cardinal Newman, in his *Apologia*. "I had a great dislike of paper logic. For myself, it was not logic that carried me on: as well might one say that the quick-silver in the barometer changes the weather. It is the concrete being that reasons."

Needless to remark, there never was a more logical mind than Newman's. Few men had given more unsparingly of their time and profoundest thought to the controversial writings of the Fathers and theologians during the long and weary years in which he was groping his way towards the light. Few outsiders were ever so well fitted to grasp the meaning and force of Catholic polemics. And yet he confesses, without reservation or qualification, that mere logic would never have sufficed to lead him to the shrine of truth.

The study of antiquity unsettled his mind, but it would not, and could not, bring him peace. The writings of the early Fathers made him question and doubt the soundness of his own position. They brought him gradually to recognize that, to all appearances, the Church of Rome was identical with the Church of the Fathers. But of themselves alone they were unable to set his mind at rest, or induce him to take the final step. The change involved in his complete assent to the odious "paper logic" was so tremendous that it appalled him utterly, and naturally inclined him to pick flaws in his own reasoning, and to question the soundness of his own conclusions. In a matter of such vital moment as the giving up of the church of his love and his friends for the church of the stranger—a stepping forth into the great unknown—we can all readily understand his mental attitude; why it was that he proceeded so slowly, so cautiously, so reluctantly, that at times he distrusted the find-

ings of reason, even to the extent of growing irritable when reasons were forced upon him.

"To come to me with methods of logic," he says, "had in it the nature of a provocation, and made me somewhat indifferent how I met them; and perhaps led me, as a means of relieving my impatience, to be mysterious or irrelevant, or to give in because I could not meet them to my satisfaction. . . . Again, sometimes when I was asked whether certain conclusions did not follow from a certain principle, I might not be able to tell at the moment, especially if the matter were complicated; and for this reason, if for no other, because there is a great difference between a conclusion in the abstract and a conclusion in the concrete. . . . Or it might so happen that my head got simply confused by the very strength of the logic which was administered to me, and thus I gave my sanction to conclusions which really were not mine, and when the report of those conclusions came round to me through others, I had to unsay them."

Such was the restless, unsatisfied condition in which mere logic left one of the most logical minds of all times. With reason, indeed, did St. Ambrose utter the words which Newman himself quotes so approvingly: "Non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum."

If logic, and history, and the Fathers, with all their combined weight and effectiveness, were unequal to the task of moving this mighty rock, what was it then that finally accomplished the work? Newman informs us, in the *Apologia*, that Dr. Russell, the President of Maynooth, had perhaps more to do with his conversion than any one else. And how did Dr. Russell succeed where logic, and history, and the Fathers had failed? Not assuredly by any species of argument or reasoning; for Newman himself tells us that the Doctor had never said a word to him on the subject of religion. "He called upon me in the Summer of 1841," writes the Cardinal. "He called again another Summer . . . I do not recollect that he said a word on the subject of religion on either occasion. He sent me at different times several letters; he was always gentle, mild, unobtrusive, uncontroversial. He let me alone."

The truth is, Dr. Russell seems to have understood Newman better than did any one else—his state of mind, his struggles, his unrest and its cause, the utter insufficiency of mere logic or reasoning to allay the fierce storm raging within. He seems to have understood just what was needed to fill the great void in Newman's heart. If he did not understand all this, he certainly "builded better than he knew," for he could not possibly have hit upon a better plan to disperse the mists that befogged the eminent Tractarian's mind, and bring peace and joy to his troubled heart.

And that plan was surely simple enough. It consisted merely in putting into Newman's hands a number of our well-known standard devotional works, such as Veron's "Rule of Faith," a volume of St. Alphonsus' Sermons, the "Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius," some treatises of the Wallenburghs, and "a large bundle of penny or half-penny books of devotion, of all sorts, as they are found in the book-sellers' shops at Rome."

And yet, small though Dr. Russell's part appeared in this great soul-drama, it was, of all, the most important and effective by far. It struck at last the right key, and proved the real turning point in Newman's conversion.

Commenting on the effect produced upon him by studying the *Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius*, Newman writes: "For here again in a matter consisting in the purest and most direct acts of religion,—in the intercourse between God and the soul, during a season of recollection, of repentance, of good resolution, of inquiry into vocation,—the soul was 'sola cum solo'; there was no cloud interposed between the creature and the Object of his faith and love. The command practically enforced was, 'My son, give Me thy heart.' The devotions then to angels and saints as little interfered with the incommunicable glory of the Eternal, as the love which we bear our friends and relations, our tender human sympathies, are inconsistent with that supreme homage of the heart to the Unseen, which really does but sanctify and exalt, not jealously destroy, what is of earth."

And anent the "large bundle of penny and half-penny books

of devotion, of all sorts," which Dr. Russell had sent him, he says: "On looking them over, I was quite astonished to find how different they were from what I had fancied, how little there was in them to which I could really object." Again, in his letter to the President of Maynooth, thanking him for the volume of St. Alphonsus' *Sermons*, he writes: "I only wish that your church were more known among us by such writings. You will not interest us in her, till we see her, not in politics, but in her true functions of exhorting, teaching and guiding. . . . It is not by learned discussions, or acute arguments, or reports of miracles, that the heart of England can be gained. It is by men 'approving themselves,' like the Apostle, 'ministers of Christ.'"

As Newman felt in this matter, so had felt the still greater Augustine, long centuries before. Though differing vastly in character and temperament, both these eminent men were led into the Church of God by the same path. Both, men of the highest mentality, both men of keenest insight into the strength or weakness of logical arguments, neither could find in pure reason or logic a thoroughgoing solution of the doubts that vexed the mind, or a suitable object to fill the great void in the troubled and aching heart.

And as in the case of Newman and Russell, so in that of Augustine and Ambrose. Both the brilliant Englishman and the brilliant African, though the greatest dialecticians, perhaps, of their respective centuries, owed their conversion, in the last analysis, not to the power of dialectics, but rather to the plain and simple exposition of the plain and simple truths of the higher life—truths which appealed irresistibly to the heart and the affections. And both freely admitted that, next to God, their deepest gratitude for their change of heart was due to men who had adopted as their motto, in dealing with souls, "Non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum."

To come nearer to our own times, it was this same phase of Catholic life and teaching that pointed out the way for such men as Hecker and his companions, and eventually brought

them into the City of God. And there are many like souls in the world today, hungering for the self-same food, and not knowing where to find it; souls groping about in the darkness, lost in the mazes of transcendentalism, and other false systems of philosophy, with troubled minds and aching hearts, seeking the light which Augustine and Newman and Hecker had the good fortune to see, and ready to follow it were but a glimpse vouchsafed them.

Of all the Protestant sects, none has retained so much of the devotional spirit of Catholicity as the Anglican, or Protestant Episcopal, denomination and it is a remarkable fact that none other has given so many converts to the Church Catholic. In spite of England's break with Rome, there has ever been found in the Anglican establishment, through all the four centuries of its schism, and more particularly in the past century, a certain element known as the high-churchmen, who have clung steadfastly to a portion of our ascetic theology, and have been more or less saturated with its spirit. In fact, the devotional works of some of the high-church bishops and divines are so Catholic in tone and spirit that the average reader, aye, and at times, even the theological student, would readily accept them for genuine Catholic products did he not know the source whence they came.

And we may well believe that the great influx of Anglican, or Protestant Episcopal, divines and laymen into the Catholic Church—the great Romeward movement which has been going on in England and our own United States, for the last fifty or sixty years, is due in largest measure, to the influence of these devotional writings. In the intervening centuries too, between Augustine and the Oxford movement, one could readily point out, did space permit, numbers of eminent converts whose happy change of heart can trace its origin back to the same fertile source.

It may be objected that, while the devotional element has, of a certainty, been largely instrumental in the matter of conversions, while it has frequently put the finishing touches to the work of conviction, it was not, after all, the first or real cause

of the change in the instances here adduced; that logic, reason, history, etc., went before and paved the way, or laid the foundation for the structure of the faith. It may be said that the method here suggested would be a reversing of the natural order, a starting at the end instead of at the beginning, a chimerical hope of plucking the ripe fruit before the tree is planted, or the seed is sown, and that the only safe and sane policy is to convince the truth-seeker of the dogmatic and historic soundness of Catholicism before introducing him to the tenets of asceticism, or the higher Christian life.

But the simple fact remains that in the cases mentioned, logic and controversy did not accomplish the work, and the devotional element did. "All the logic in the world would not have made me move faster towards Rome than I did," says Newman. "It is not by learned discussions, or acute arguments, or reports of miracles, that the heart of England can be gained." And surely if any man is a competent judge of the point in discussion, that man is Newman. He had read the last word on polemics, or apologetics, and that last word left him thoroughly unsatisfied. It was not till he met Dr. Russell, with his "large bundle of penny and half-penny works of devotion, of all sorts," that his eyes were fully opened to the light of truth. And it is highly probable that, if he had not met Dr. Russell, or been introduced to these devotional writings by some other means, he would have ended after the manner of Pusey and Keble, and Froude.

All the dialectics of the schools meant very little to him, without the devotional phase; the devotional phase alone would have meant everything to him, without so much as a word of dialectics. If he had never read a line in defense of the Catholic position, these writings would have sufficed to convince him of the truth by intuition; or by reasoning, if you will—not the roundabout reasoning of systematic dialectics, but the simplest, though best of arguments, the argument from cause and effect. From Newman's own account of his conversion, there can be scarcely any doubt that, had he come upon these devotional works earlier in his career, he would have landed in the Church many years sooner than he did.

Augustine, too, had doubtless read or heard all the apologetic arguments of his day, for we know that he always had a mind open to conviction, and was an indefatigable seeker after the truth. Yet, nothing seemed to make much of an impression up him till he met Ambrose, the man who openly declared that "*non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum.*"

Is it not perfectly true that "the tree is known by its fruits"? Did not Christ Himself adopt this very means of proving His divine mission? When John the Baptist sent two of his disciples to ask Him: "Art Thou He Who is to come?" "Or do we look for another?" the Master answered, not with set speech, or syllogistic reasoning, or a formidable array of verbal proofs, but simply by pointing to His works: "Go, tell John what you have seen and heard. The blind see, the deaf hear, the dumb speak, the lepers are cleansed, the dead rise again," etc. Works count for more than words. One's deeds are his best credentials. Here are My works. They speak for themselves. No comment of mine is needed. Here are the works of the Messiah, as foretold by the Prophet Isaiah, and the rest of the prophets. Draw your own inference. "A good tree cannot bring forth bad fruit, nor an evil tree, good fruit." These are My fruits. They are undeniably good. Therefore the tree which produced them must itself be good. Here, before your very eyes, are effects which transcend the powers of nature, which prove conclusively a mastery over Nature. Hence their Author can be no other than Nature's God and Master.

It is the same old argument from cause and effect, and it was not the only time the Master used it. Time and again, when His hearers refused to accept His testimony concerning Himself, He thus addressed them: "If you will not believe Me, then believe My works, for the same give testimony of Me." If you will not judge Me by what I say of Myself, then judge Me by what I do. The effect cannot be greater than the cause.

The old soldier who has won his laurels on many a hotly-contested battle-field, amid the whizzing of bullets and the cannon's roar, has no need to proclaim aloud his bravery on

every street corner. Every one admits it. Nor is it necessary for any man who has made great sacrifices for his country's weal to be everlastingly prating about his patriotism. His deeds speak far more eloquently than any words.

And just so with the devotional, or ascetic, writings of the Church. They carry with them their own credentials, and have their own intrinsic worth. They offer one of the most striking proofs of the divinity of the Church, for they are manifestly the ripe fruits of a good, sound tree, the effects of a cause which can be no other than truth itself. And as such, bearing about them, upon their face, the very hall-marks of truth, they must, of necessity, appeal to each and every sincere truth-seeker who has a particle of reason in his mental make-up. It is an inductive process. Clever sophists may raise plausible objections to the very strongest and soundest of our controversial or apologetic arguments, but that the teachings found in our standard devotional writings are verily the ripe fruits of holiness not one of them can gainsay. And even where these works do not of themselves beget conviction, they are likely at least to give rise to a questioning attitude of mind, and a predisposition, which may eventually lead the thoughtful and earnest reader into the Temple of Truth.

The examples thus far given, of the effect produced by the devotional, or ascetic, writings of the Church, have all been taken from among eminent thinkers. It is not, however, the cultured alone who are favorably affected by this species of teaching. What has been said, applies with equal force, perhaps with even greater force, to the rank and file of the seekers after truth. Dialectics, the language of the head, is, after all, the language of the comparatively few, while asceticism, the language of the heart, is intelligible to the multitudes. The average man may not be able to follow a train of reasoning, but he can readily grasp the thoughts and meaning of the "Imitation of Christ." Let the preacher note the effects of both methods on his audience, and he will find this to be a fact.

Every preacher who has tried it, realizes the deep interest aroused, and the wholesome effect produced, by a liberal sprink-

ling of the devotional element in his sermons. It seems to strike at once a sympathetic chord in every heart. The hearer may not have heard much of the language of asceticism: he may even be listening to it for the first time in his life, but immediately and instinctively it appeals to him as just the proper and natural thing, and the good wrought by it is incomparably greater than that which results from frequent diversions into the highways and byways of learned scientific disquisition. Science enlightens, but the theology of ascetism edifies.

To the many, the philosophy of an Aristotle is an insoluble enigma; but the philosophy of an à Kempis is intelligible to all, and all can enter sympathetically into the mind and heart of the man who "had rather feel contrition than know its definition."

The presentation of the intellectual side of religion is profitable to some, but the devotional element is profitable always and for all. Mind speaking to mind is often a doubtful benefit, or even a positive waste of time and energy. But an appeal to the heart is always in order. In the Christian, as in the political, economy, it is well for the preacher to keep steadily in view "the greatest good of the greatest number," and that "greatest good of the greatest number" is best attained, not by lofty flights into the æther of metaphysics, or by excursions into the realms of profane science, not by the technical language of the philosopher, but rather by a plain and simple presentation of the plain and simple truths which appeal irresistibly to man's heart and affections; in short, by just such material as we find ready to hand in the devotional writings of à Kempis, St. Francis de Sales, St. Ignatius, Lawrence Scupoli, Scaramelli, St. Alphonsus, Tauler, Rodriguez, Father Faber, etc.

The writer has often thought, with the great Cardinal Newman, while listening to the devotional talks given during a retreat, what a pity it is that the whole Protestant world cannot drop in unannounced and hear them, and learn to know us as we really are. Such conferences would surely prove the very best object lessons for them, and serve better, perhaps, than any other single influence, to open their eyes to the real holiness

of the Church. The great trouble is that the vast majority of non-Catholics who know us at all, know us only, or mainly, through our apologetic or controversial writings and sermons which, frequently, as in the case of Newman, produce a questioning, or an unsettled, attitude of mind, and even, at times, draw them very nigh to conviction, but leave the heart cold and barren.

Speaking of the Christian faith, Hawthorne compares it to a grand cathedral with divinely-pictured windows. "Standing without," he writes, "you see no glory, nor can possibly imagine any: standing within, every ray of light reveals a harmony of unspeakable splendor." What he says of Christianity in general is peculiarly applicable to the Church. Until one is inside the pale, he can never, of course, understand Catholicity as it is in deed and truth. But the next best thing is to get the earnest truth-seeker as far as possible within the atmosphere of the Church, and that atmosphere is the element found in our standard devotional, or ascetic, works which furnish the key to the inner heart and life of the Church, and deal, not so much with the essentials and absolute requirements of faith, as with the supererogatory service arising, not from a mere sense of duty, but rather from an ardent love; whose motto, or ideal, therefore, is not the minimum, but the maximum, of service.

Is it inaccurate to state that sufficient attention is not given to this devotional phase of Catholic teaching by our theological students, or even by the rank and file of the clergy on the mission? From the writer's own observation as student, teacher, and priest on the mission, he has reason to believe that the statement is not inaccurate. Though ample opportunities are afforded us, as students and priests, to become acquainted with our standard devotional works, by far the greater number pass lightly over this department, seemingly regarding it as a matter of small importance, while in fact and truth it is the very essence and marrow and substance of our Catholic life. And not infrequently the language of ascetic theology is more of a stranger to the spiritual director than to those whom he is called upon to direct.

It is very easy to pick out the priest who is saturated with the spirit and writings of the ascetics. He is recognized particularly in the pulpit and the confessional. Such a one finds little or no difficulty in speaking to his people. He needs not have recourse to sermon books. He is never at a loss for matter of discourse, for he is filled to repletion with the very essence of the Gospel teaching and the Gospel spirit.

It is very easy too, to pick out the priest who is utterly unacquainted with the devotional side of Catholic theology. There is something woefully lacking about him, and though his people may not be aware of what that something is, they can scarcely fail to note the deficiency. There is almost the same difference between him and the priest well versed in ascetic theology as there is between the graduate of the grammar school and the trained university scholar. He may be an excellent rhetorician, or even a first-rate orator; his diction and delivery may be perfection itself; his reasoning may be flawless, his illustrations proof positive of his familiarity with many sciences, both sacred and profane. But, notwithstanding all these excellences, without a liberal infusion of the devotional or ascetic element, the vital sap is wanting to his discourse—the *pectus*, the *divinus afflatus*—and his auditors would be justified in leaving with the plaintive murmur, “We asked you for bread, and you gave us stones.”

It is not a question here of the value of these devotional writings for the priest's own spiritual guidance. That much is taken for granted. The principal aim of the article is to emphasize their value in the work of conversion. But it is perfectly in order, nevertheless, to make a remark or two anent their value, their utility, and even absolute necessity, to the priest who means to deal squarely with his own people. Ascetic theology's place in the pulpit has already been pointed out. Its place in the confessional is of still greater importance.

In every parish there are devout souls not content to remain on the comparatively low level of mere adhesion to strict duty, souls animated with a generous love, who want to do, not barely what they have to, but what they can, who want to soar

above the common, and are earnestly striving after perfection, and do not know how to go about it. If they attempt to soar without the wings of spiritual science, they are sure to fall and grow discouraged. They need help, guidance and direction, and naturally look to the priest for it, and have a perfect right to expect it. But a mere acquaintance with dogmatic and moral theology, and sacred scripture, however thorough, will not suffice for this. To do the work properly, the director must be imbued with the spirit and teachings of the masters of the spiritual life. Piety will not make good the deficiency. Hence it is that St. Teresa preferred a learned confessor—one well versed in the tenets of the spiritual life—without great piety, to a pious director without the requisite knowledge.

The director of such devout souls will recommend devotional works for their guidance. And here again it is of vital importance that he know the precise character of the books which he puts into the hands of his penitents. Not all books of devotion are suitable for each and every individual penitent. It goes without saying that neither human souls nor human bodies can be treated in the mass. The efficient spiritual director, like the competent bodily physician, must know the individual conditions and needs of his clients, and the specific remedy for each and every specific ill. And this presupposes a fairly thorough acquaintance with the works of ascetic theology.

In some of the older ascetic treatises there is a good deal of chaff mixed with the pure wheat. And, while their doctrinal teachings are, in the main, or wholly, perfectly sound and fruitful, many of the examples and legends which they record are apt to raise a smile of amusement, or even contempt, on the lips of the modern reader. To put such a book into the hands of a cultured beginner in the spiritual life, or even worse, into the hands of a non-Catholic seeker after truth, without explanation or discrimination, would certainly do more harm than good. It would be just as bad as giving the wrong medicine to the sick man.

To recommend the life of a St. Aloysius or a St. Stanislaus, to a weak, timid, half discouraged toiler up the steep incline,

would be the height of imprudence. And, to say the least, it would be a mere waste of time and energy to attempt to nourish the spiritual life of the average layman or the woman of the world, on a diet specifically meant for monks and nuns. The same holds true, of course, for our own recommendations anent the spiritual life, whether in the pulpit or the tribunal of penance. In every instance, it is of the utmost importance to use good judgment, and adapt our advices to the character of the people with whom we are dealing.

We claim, and rightly, that the Church Catholic has ample means of grace for each and all—and this possession is one of the most convincing proofs of our genuine Catholicity. But to choose the most suitable means in every individual case, so as to produce the greatest possible amount of good, often requires considerable judgment and knowledge.

By way of illustration, the following quotation from Newman (*Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, pp. 194-5), is very pertinent. "Now it must be observed that the writings of St. Alfonso, as I knew them by the extracts commonly made from them, prejudiced me as much against the Roman Church as anything else, on account of what was called their 'Mariolatry'; but there was nothing of the kind in this book. I wrote to ask Dr. Russell whether anything had been left out in the translation: he answered that there certainly were omissions in one sermon about the Blessed Virgin. This omission, in the case of a book intended for Catholics, at least showed that such passages as are found in the works of Italian Authors were not acceptable to every part of the Catholic world."

"It is the common rule," says Faber, "that an ill-instructed person can never attain any considerable heights in devotion. He must have, for the most part, a knowledge of spiritual things." And how can the people be otherwise than ill-instructed if the clergymen are unenlightened? How can they know of the spiritual life, if their spiritual guides themselves are ignorant of it? How can the guides give what they do not possess? "The lips of the priest shall guard wisdom, and they shall require it at his mouth."

Nor is it only for the more devout souls in his flock that the priest needs an acquaintance with the teachings and methods of asceticism. It is useful likewise for the whole flock, at least in small doses; and not alone useful, but even necessary, if they are to be prevented from drifting into mere formalism, or externalism, and dry routine. No matter how much elementary dogmatic and moral theology we may give them, without a savor of the devotional element there will be little or no unction in their Catholic life, and they are likely to continue throughout nothing more than mere automata.

The plan of beginning the work of conversion with an introduction to the ascetical writings of the Church is not something altogether new and untried. Faber tried it years ago in England, and it proved a grand success. As his biographer informs us: "For the conversion of Protestants, the same means were relied on, (the means suggested in this article) and it was soon found that the simple, unargumentative explanation of Catholic truth was the most efficacious means of bringing wanderers into the fold." Or, as Faber himself puts it:

"By haughty word, cold force of mind,
We seek not hearts to rule;
Hearts win the hearts they seek! Behold
The secret of our school!"

And the biographer adds: "After the course of lectures on Protestantism, with which the daily evening exercises at the Oratory were commenced at Brompton, Father Faber never preached a controversial sermon."

It was Newman's method also, to a great extent, in his "Parochial and Plain Sermons"; and long before either Newman or Faber, St. Ambrose (as we have pointed out in the foregoing pages) tried it with the happiest results.

From all this it is very evident that the Catholic—priest or layman—who is thoroughly saturated with the spirit and teachings of asceticism, not only benefits himself personally, but is in a position to do the most effective kind of missionary work both among his own co-religionists and the large body of sincere, truth-seeking Christians who are still beyond the pale. With

all the opportunities afforded us of forming an acquaintance with the devotional writings of ascetic theology, it would be a shame for us to neglect this highly efficient means of adding to the growth of Christ's Kingdom—to pass lightly over this department, seemingly regarding it as a matter of little importance whereas, in fact and truth, it is the very essence and marrow and substance of our Catholic life.

JOHN E. GRAHAM.

ST. ELIZABETH'S CHURCH,
BALTIMORE, MD.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Geschichte der Altkirchlichen Literatur. Von Otto Bardenhewer, Professor der Theologie an der Universität München. Dritter Band. Das Vierte Jahrhundert mit Ausschluss der Schriftsteller Syrischer Zunge. Herder: Freiburg im Breisgau, St. Louis, Mo., 1912. Gr. 8°. Pp. x + 665.

The general plan of Professor Bardenhewer's monumental History of early Ecclesiastical Literature as distinct from his Patrology is too well known to be adverted to here. Both works deal with the same subject, but on an entirely different scale, for whereas Patristic literature was dealt with in one volume in the Patrology, this more extended work has gone into three large volumes, which reach only as far as the early part of the fifth century. Following his general scheme the author commences with a general survey of the life of the Church in the period with which he is concerned and classifies the various needs and developments of the time as showing the different forces and the various influences under which Christian writings assumed their special character. With this general survey the reader is placed in a position to grasp more readily, and at a saving of much repetition the lines of thought, controversial and constructive, which are exhibited in the works of the various authors. Another saving of time and attention is made by the division of authors according to countries, for while the general needs of the Church in doctrinal and polemical matters were the same throughout, the peculiar local needs are better illustrated in the manner followed in this book. Biographical notices are confined to essentials and are written with the special view of throwing light on the literary activities of the various authors. How necessary this was will be evident when it is remembered what a distinguished list of writers and theologians the fourth century produced, and what an enormous output there was in all fields of ecclesiastical science. To say nothing of the minor authors whose works are mines of information on the many-sided conflict between expiring paganism and Christianity, space had to be found for the manifold activities of such men as Athanasius,

Didymus the Blind, Marcellus of Ancyra, the Great Cappadocians, Eusebius of Caesarea, Epiphanius of Salamis, John Chrysostom, Ambrose, Rufinus and Jerome. One feature of unique importance which will be appreciated by students, is the clearness and accuracy with which some departments of Christian literature are analysed and discussed. This applies especially to ascetical works, Christian poetry, and the few *Itineraria* which date from this period. On critical and bibliographical matters not much is left unsaid. The texts, translations and editions are enumerated, and a sufficient number of secondary sources indicated to put students and investigators in possession of all the information necessary for the profitable use of the works of the Christian authors of the fourth century. Dr. Bardenhewer has raised a lasting memorial in this useful and scholarly work.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Eve of Catholic Emancipation, being the history of the English Catholics during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. By The Right Rev. Monsignor Bernard Ward, F. R. Hist. S. Vol. III, 1820-1829. Longmans, Green & Co. New York, 1912. Large 8°. Pp. viii + 390.

The struggle for religious freedom in the British Isles, which ended with the passage of the Emancipation Act is a subject which may be studied with profit even by those who have no special interest in the people or history of England or Ireland. Under the guise of Christianity the state assumed to dictate what the religion of its subjects should be. Monsignor Ward's study is directed especially to an examination of the condition of English Catholics. In their case the religious conflict was not intensified by national hatred as in the case of Ireland, and a picture is presented of what invariably happens when the civil power assumes to act outside its legitimate sphere. The contents of the book are interesting and various. A spirit of frank, but never bitter, criticism runs through it, which will not be taken amiss when the various influences at work among the Catholics and their opponents are borne in mind. Whatever of criticism does occur seems only to confirm the author in his general tone of optimism regarding the outlook for Catholicism in the British Isles at the present. The part which

the Irish and especially their great leader, Daniel O'Connell, had in bringing about the reform of the status of Catholics is not overlooked, and gives the author an opportunity for the irenic passage with which he concludes: "The English Catholics should never forget what they owe to their brethren in Ireland, without whose assistance in the time of struggle the modern development of Catholicity in this country would never have been possible." There is a valuable list of documents and appendices and a chronological table of events, which aid materially in elucidating many passages in the body of the history.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Price of Unity. By B. W. Maturin. Longmans, Green and Co. New York, 1912. Pp. xxxiv + 283.

The unity referred to is church unity or more specifically the unity of the Anglican and Catholic churches, and the price the sacrifices which those Anglicans who profess themselves members of the one, true church must be prepared to make in order to be so. Though necessarily controversial in character the book aims at being as much as possible non-controversial in tone. The author is one who made the passage from Anglicanism to Catholicism himself, and in discussing the reasons why members of the High Church party in the Anglican fold should, in the cause of consistency, take the same step, he views the subject throughout from the standpoint of men who are dealing with the same difficulties which beset him before his conversion. The place of the Church of Rome as the one, true church possessing historically and dogmatically the claim to be regarded as the church founded by Christ is set forth with vigor and cogency, though, from the special character of the arguments, addressed as they are to Anglicans and especially to High Church Anglicans, the discussion is limited to the field of Anglican and Roman controversy. In a sense the subject under discussion may be called the Psychology of Conversion. The author does not minimize the difficulties, intellectual and practical, which confront Anglicans who are desirous of entering the Catholic Church. He is at pains to show the many reasons which might be looked on as deterrent influences in such cases, reasons arising from the break with old associations and the

formation of new; but he points out that consistency should impel men to abandon a position which judged by their own professions is incongruous and untenable, and to judge the church which fulfills their conception of what the real church ought to be, not by the representations of its enemies, but by the opinions of those who know its spirit and its organisation from within. Written to meet the needs of a special class, this work ought to serve as a valuable aid and guide for those whose minds are beset with the difficulty of finding spiritual peace, and a church free from the doubts and uncertainties which arise from fluctuating and discordant doctrines.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Palladius, Histoire Lausiaque. (Vies d'Ascètes et de Pères du Désert). Texte Grec, Introduction et Traduction Française. Par A. Lucot, Aumonier des Chartreux à Dijon. Paris, Alphonse Picard et Fils. 1912. 12mo. Pp. lx + 425.

The Greek text published here is taken from Dom Butler's work in the "Cambridge Texts and Studies" with some emendations suggested by Dom Butler himself in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, and still further explained in a letter to the editor which is published in a footnote. There is a good, though brief, introduction dealing with various topics: Oriental Monasticism, The Life of Palladius, Manuscripts of the *Historia Lausiaca*, etc. Its contents, doctrinal and ascetical, will place the student in position to use the history itself with understanding and profit. The editors of the series are to be congratulated as well on the choice of texts which they have published as on the thoroughly satisfactory manner in which the work is executed.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Florilegium Hebraicum. Locos selectos Veteris Testamenti. . . edidit Dr. Hub. Lindemann. Freiburg i. B. Herder, 1912. Pp. xii + 215. Price 90 cents net.

The aim of the present chrestomathy is to acquaint the student with the different styles of the Hebrew Bible, both in prose and

poetry. The text used is the Massoretic text as reproduced mainly in the edition of Hahn, Letteris and Kittel. No vocabulary has been added to oblige the pupils to have recourse to a dictionary and thus increase their own efficiency.

In an Appendix, the author has added the Siloam Inscription, specimens of the Babylonian Massoretic punctuation, a page of Yiddish transcription and a table of the Rabbinical characters.

The selection, as a rule is judiciously made. The type is clear and large, and the whole book has a very pleasing appearance.

From an educational point of view, it would have been good to reproduce at least some sections directly from the best mss. or from the edition of Ginsburg, in order to give the student an idea of what the Massoretic text really is.

We have no doubt that a student who cannot afford to buy a copy of the entire Bible will derive great benefit from this little publication. Even the one who has a copy of the Sacred Text can be guided by Dr. Lindemann in his selection of passages for reading and study.

R. BUTIN, S. M.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The following is the text of the discourse delivered by Reverend Doctor Fox in the chapel of Gibbons Hall, on the occasion of the Feast of the Conversion of Saint Paul:

Saint Paul a Patron of the University.

“ Paul, standing in the midst of the Areopagus said: ye men of Athens I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For passing by and seeing your idols I found an altar also on which was written: To the unknown God. What, therefore, you worship without knowing, that I preach to you. *Acts*, xvii, 23.

We are assembled today to honor St. Paul, the Doctor of the Gentiles, in some respects the greatest of the Apostles, though in his humbleness he called himself the last, and one not worthy to be an apostle because he had persecuted the Church of God. The good men who founded this institution chose him as the Patron of the Theological School. Had there not been a tenderer and immeasurably higher claim he might with propriety have been taken as the Patron of the University at large. Even if there were one speaking to you today competent to undertake the task of describing the character of Paul or the wonderful story of his life it would be obviously out of place to attempt it on the present occasion.

The inspired writings introduce him first as among the enemies of the Gospel guarding the garments of those who stoned St. Stephen to death, while the martyr, following his Master's example, prayed for his enemies. That prayer was answered on the day when, still burning with honest but blind zeal for the religion of his fathers, on his way to Damascus to urge on the persecution of the converts, Saul was stricken to the ground by the Divine mercy while he heard the voice of Christ saying to him: “ Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? ” He fell a Jew, and arose a Christian.

Thenceforth he was the apostle not sent from men, nor by men, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father who raised Him from the

dead. Shortly afterwards, in Damascus, where he was to have co-operated with the Jewish persecutors, he entered on his mission by going into the synagogue to preach Christ crucified. A Hebrew of the Hebrews, as to the righteousness of the Law unblameable, and hitherto zealous to maintain that Israel alone was the people of God, he was yet the first to grasp fully the truth that in the New Dispensation there is no distinction of Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian and Scythian, bondsman and freeman, but Christ is all in all. Thereafter, for twenty years, with a zeal and devotion that knew no bounds, he spent himself in his august vocation of announcing the Glad-tidings; journeying from city to city, from town to town; now among the rude inhabitants of Lycaonia, now in the centres of Greek culture and Roman power, and, again, in places which had won a bad pre-eminence as the homes of Asiatic profligacy; at one time confronting the ignorance and pride of Paganism, at another, struggling with the Jews whose ignorance was all the darker and whose pride was all the fiercer because they were born of knowledge perverted and grace abused.

Need we recall the innumerable hardships and sufferings which, before the executioner's sword closed gloriously his career, befell the apostle, a man of weak frame and burdened with a life-long infirmity? Of these trials he himself gives but an incomplete enumeration when he tells us:

"Five times I received from the Jews the forty stripes save one; thrice I was scourged with the Roman rods; once I was stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck; a night and a day have I spent in the open sea. In journeyings often; in perils of rivers, in perils of robbers; in perils from my countrymen; in perils from the heathen. In toil and weariness, often in sleepless watchings; in hunger and thirst, often without bread to eat; in cold and nakedness." Through all his days only one ambition possessed him, one motive inspired him, to win souls to his Master; the charity of Christ urged him on and he could say truly: "I live, not I but Christ liveth in me."

Brought up in a university town, he was a man of cultured mind, well acquainted with his age. Profoundly versed in the Scriptures, he was able to vanquish the doctors of the synagogue on their own ground. At the same time, before another kind of audience he could make apposite citations from the heathen poets.

Versed in affairs he perceived that the shortest way to the conversion of the Pagan world was to spread the gospel in the great cities of the empire and especially in Rome itself. When the interest of his work demanded it, he who shrank from no ignominy on his own account, boldly asserted his claim to the proud distinction of having been born a Roman citizen and demanded reparation from the magistrates who, in violation of his rights through this title had imprisoned him. At another time, when he was to be subjected to trial that might have ended by interrupting his work, he pronounced the words which, when uttered by a Roman citizen placed him above the competence of every court of inferior jurisdiction: "I appeal unto Cæsar."

His physical courage never deserts him, whether he is in the clutches of an angry mob, or on the deck of a sinking ship, or amid the falling walls of a building overthrown by an earthquake. Nor does his higher moral courage ever fail before the learned or the mighty ones of the world; and, when principle is at stake, he, the last of the Apostles, resists even Peter to his face.

With the shrewdness of a trained lawyer or statesman, he divides his enemies and accusers by throwing among them a bone of contention. He introduces himself and his cause, when necessary, with all the ingratiating suavity of the accomplished rhetorician. "I think myself happy, King Agrippa, that I shall defend myself today before thee against all the charges of my Jewish accusers, especially because thou art expert in all Jewish customs and questions." When Agrippa, impressed in spite of himself by Paul's discourse, said to him, with courtly irony: "Thou wilt soon persuade me to be a Christian," Paul replied with his customary zeal, indeed, yet tinctured with graceful, almost playful courtesy: "Would to God that soon or late, not only thou but all who hear me today were such as I am," and he pointed to the manacles which bound him to the Roman soldier, his guard, "excepting these chains."

How can we describe the tender kindness and love which glowed in the heart of Paul for those whom he had begotten in the Gospel? It burns in every page of his letters to them. To cite the instances would be to repeat the Epistles; one must suffice. Let us recall his reproof of the wayward Corinthians. He treats them exactly as a loving mother would her naughty darling. He intended to visit them personally; but, instead, he wrote to them. Why? he

tells us: "I determined not again to visit you in grief; for if I cause you grief who is there to cause me joy but those whom I grieve? And for this very reason I wrote to you, out of much affection and anguish of heart; with many tears, not to pain you, but that you might know the abundance of my love." Love begets love. If we had no other indication of Paul's love for his children we might gauge its intensity by their affection for him—an affection manifested by their constant solicitude for his welfare, their longing when he was absent; their joy on hearing of his approach; their haste to meet him on the way, along the Ephesian shore, or the Roman road; the tears which they were wont to shed at his departure; their sorrow's crown of sorrow when the parting was rendered sadder by the conviction that they should look upon his face no more.

Only the hand of a master could draw even an inadequate picture of the human love, merged in the fire of divine charity of which in all his dealings, in all his writings, Paul gave unflagging proof, to his friends, to his converts, to the backsliders, to those who refused his gift of the Glad-tidings, and even to those who obstructed his mission and hated himself. That picture has been drawn by a master hand, in pages to most of you familiar, which shall last as long as our English speech.

Do we wish a picture of the merely natural man? Then, if his own example will permit us the license of recurring to the secular poet, we might find an epitome of Paul's human character in the words:

His life was gentle; and the elements
So mix't in him that Nature might stand up
And say to all the world: This was a man.

If we should wish to select out of the varied episodes of Paul's career one that might be taken, in our own mind's eye, or as the subject of a tableau, appropriately to present the great Apostle as a patron of the University, which might we choose?

The victim stricken on the Damascus Road? The disciple of Gamaliel and of Christ confounding the learning of the Sanhedrin, the chained prisoner subduing with his eloquence the most noble Festus and his royal guests? The wandering missionary in loving converse with some band of his beloved neophytes? The inspired writer, pen in hand, recording in human characters the revelations

from on High; or the lonely old man, deserted by all, on trial for his life, standing undaunted before the judgment seat of imperial Cæsar himself?

St. Augustine has said: "Three things I wish I could have seen,—Rome in her glory, Paul in the pulpit, and the Saviour in the flesh." If, then, we agree with Augustine that Paul delivering a discourse best satisfies our imagination when assisting our intellect to understand and our hearts to feel the greatness and goodness of the Doctor of the Gentiles, it would seem that the University would find its Saint Paul in that historic scene, when, on the Athenian hill, in the person of Paul, the Gospel for the first time confronted Greek philosophy, the fine flower of mere natural reason. A man of wide knowledge, if not perhaps a profound scholar, Paul was at least acquainted with Greek literature. He knew the glorious rôle which Greece had played in the drama of the world; he spoke her language as his mother tongue. As he passed through the beautiful city, he saw monuments and edifices at every turn and on every hill, celebrating her glories and manifesting her still enduring supremacy in sculpture and architecture. High over all towered the majestic statue of Pallas Athene, cast from the brazen trophies gathered after the mighty battle in which Athenian valor had forever preserved European civilization from Asiatic despotism. Here were the memories of the Academy founded by the mind which reached a conception of God that still charms us by its beauty; memories, too, of the *Master of those who know*, and of that philosophy which in years still far distant was to be subdued to become the handmaid of the Gospel. The Stoic was there who, with all his pride and self-sufficiency, could teach man no higher precept than to play the Roman fool and die on his own sword. There, also, were the haunts and the representatives of that other philosopher whose teaching lived not merely in the schools, but was the practical maxim of society, high and low: Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die. Everywhere around were superb statues and temples bearing witness to the truth that although the choice teachers of Greece had, through their knowledge of the visible world, reached a knowledge of the invisible Creator, yet they glorified him not as God, but in their reasonings went astray after vanity, till their senseless hearts were darkened so that they forsook the glory of the imperishable God for idols made in the likeness of perishable men, and, receiving in themselves the due recompense of their transgressions, became filled with all unrighteousness.

Paul who elsewhere gave expression to the zeal that burned within him by the exclamation, "Woe is me if I preach not the Gospel," could not disregard the signal opportunity of presenting Christ crucified to the unbeliever. So he accepted the call, when, after having attracted general attention by announcing the Gospel to the people in the market place, he was invited to address the intellectual *élite* of the city which might then be called the great university of the world, in the court of the Areopagus, around which gathered a thousand memories of great historic national causes and mythical associations.

With his customary prudence and address, Paul opened his discourse in a fashion apt to conciliate the civic pride of his hearers, and to introduce his doctrine as one which in some measure they already acknowledged. "Ye men of Athens: all things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion. For, as I passed through your city and beheld the object of your worship I found amongst them an altar with this inscription: To the Unknown God. Him, therefore, whom ye worship though ye know Him not, Him I declare unto you." In his subsequent remarks, scholars see Paul presenting the true doctrine of the nature of God with surpassing skill of speech and philosophy, in such a manner that Stoic and Epicurean alike might acknowledge its grandeur and its resemblance to their own respective conceptions. He also quoted one of the Greek poets to support and illustrate his teaching; and then immediately passed on to announce the providence of God, the folly of idolatry, and the great doctrine of the Resurrection. His speech, as you know, lasted but a brief time; for it was cut short by an outburst of derisive laughter from part of the audience. As Paul departed, some, either through courtesy, or because they were impressed by the Apostle's words, kindly said to him: "We shall hear thee again on this matter." The result of Paul's effort, as far as the Scripture informs us was that Dyonisius, one of the Areopagites, a woman named Damaris, and a few others became his followers.

"But," it may be said, "Paul on the Areopagus, is scarcely a felicitous choice as typical of the University. Does it not appear that he experienced there a comparative failure? When, afterwards, he wrote to the Corinthians does he not seem by implication to declare that he had at least once trusted too much to surpassing skill of speech and the persuasive words of human wisdom?"

He himself tells us that when, shortly afterwards, he went to Corinth he employed no longer the resources of culture and education, and, instead, proclaimed his message not in the persuasive words of human wisdom. The Greeks had demanded philosophy; he had drawn, in the Areopagus, upon his knowledge of the philosophers; but to the Corinthians, and afterwards, he preached only Christ crucified, and the folly of the Cross, for the folly of God is wiser than the wisdom of men.

This may be all true; yet, notwithstanding that it is true, perhaps all the more because it is true, the University may look to Paul's rôle on the Areopagus as the type of its own.

The Church does not, and never did, place her strongest trust in human learning. Nevertheless, she has always cultivated it and employed it as a subsidiary auxiliary to her divine powers; an auxiliary which has its proper field. And never in the Church's history was there a more promising field than there is today for scholarship and university learning to do signal service to the cause of religious truth. The very existence of a Catholic University is in itself a triumphant answer to the most specious attack which unbelief directs against faith in our own day. What is the commonplace of our opponents? It is: Catholics remain Catholics only because they are behind the age. Let a Catholic once acquire a knowledge of the great sciences, of history, of archaeology, of modern philosophy; let him but once grasp the implications of the conquests which physical science has made concerning the universe at large, the origin of life in general, and of human life in particular; the path which nature has followed as the cosmic vapor proceeded along its evolving course through countless ages till it developed, first, life, and later, reason. Let him observe and study the ladder on which reason has slowly climbed from the non-moral existence of ape and tiger, by a slow ascent from lower to higher, in the development of morals; the records of long buried civilizations; the destruction wrought by modern learning on the evidence for Christianity; the witness of history against the claim of the Church to unchangeableness; the utter confusion inflicted by modern speculation on our time honored philosophy.—Let, they say, a Catholic become even moderately at home in all these subjects and you will find that his faith has evaporated like a mist before the noonday sun.

The cultured unbelief of today does not directly attack us—it rather ignores us; and believes that as the malarias and noxious

growths of certain regions are extirpated by bringing the land under cultivation, so the propagation of modern knowledge creates an atmosphere in which Catholic faith must languish and finally disappear.

Here, then, is the first service which the University has to render to the Church. The purpose of the University would be futile indeed if it aimed at bringing together a body of men, teachers and students, consecrated to scorn delights and live laborious days, while hiving wisdom with each studious year, merely for the love of knowledge, or, to use the favorite catchword of the day, the advancement of culture. It is instituted to give the lie to the assertion that present day knowledge and the Catholic faith cannot inhabit the same soul. If the University did no more than to offer to the world the spectacle of a body of teachers and disciples abreast of the learning of the day, and yet as strong in the faith as the simple and unlettered, it would have abundantly justified its existence. It does this, and it does a great deal more. It is not merely a silent monument witnessing by its existence to the truth that Catholicism and learning can walk hand in hand. All its different departments contribute in their respective fields to the active defense of the truth.

Its scriptural scholarship has to maintain in these days that God who at sundry times and in diverse manners spoke of old to our fathers in the faith by the prophets, in later days has spoken to all the world by His Son whom he appointed heir of all things; its dogmatic courses make good the profession of the Church that she has guarded the Divine deposit and still holds fast to the sound form of doctrine which she has kept from the beginning. The ecclesiastical historian, tracing the course of the Church through the centuries preaching Christ crucified, demonstrates that from the time she was scourged by the Roman rods, she, like Paul, has suffered all form of hardship from within and without, but made shipwreck—Never. The Schools of Morals and Law and Social Science set forth the eternal principles of righteousness on which alone can the individual life and society be rightly ordered. The School of Letters contributes to clothe all the other forms of learning with the grace and culture which, after the example of Paul, may be engaged in the commendation and defense of Divine truth. Need I say that today Catholic Philosophy, addressing the outside world of thought, finds its text ready to hand in the words of Paul: "As I pass through your city of books, and

behold the digests of your speculations, I find among them many an inscription to the God unknown and unknowable: Him that you ignore I declare unto you."

It may be said, however, that after all, the Catholic University, as a whole, or through the individual efforts of its members with voice or pen, does not seem to produce any very perceptible results upon non-Catholic thought. Perhaps. It is quite true that convincing presentations of the Church's doctrine, or the statement of our philosophy or our apologetics falls, for the most part, on deaf ears. Or, if a hearing is accorded to us and some impression is made, our opponents dismiss us with a polite "Paul, we shall listen to you more at length on this subject by and by"; and they go their unremembering way. Nevertheless, it is not in vain that the light shines in the darkness even though the darkness refuses to comprehend it. Besides, now and again, a Dionysius or a Damaris and, perhaps, some others, may be the visible return for our work, while its entire influence can be traced only by God himself. You, young gentlemen of the laity, remember that your ascription to the University has imposed upon you a special obligation. The generosity which maintains this institution expects that it will send forth young men, who, qualified to achieve an honorable position in their respective walks of life, shall be, in these positions, worthy representatives of the Catholic faith, examples of loyalty to the less instructed brethren, and always ready to do their best in the promotion of every good work. Act so that your non-Catholic associates, patrons, employers or employees, may habitually say of you: He is a Catholic, I can trust him. Loyalty to your religion will guarantee loyalty to your country; and if your reputation be such as I have described, then, when occasion calls on you to protest against any petty meanness of bigotry or irreligion that would trespass upon the rights of Catholic citizens you will speak with power, be it in private or in public, as you appeal against injustice, not to any individual Cæsar, but to the august Spirit of American Freedom.

In conclusion, dear Brethren, let us trust that as we are gathered here today to do honor to our great patron on his feast, he in return is looking down upon us with all his human tenderness not extinguished, but rendered a thousand fold more loving by his participation of the Vision face to face, and that he is bestowing on us his favorite blessing; that blessing which contains all blessings: May the grace of the Lord Jesus be with you.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Public Lectures. The following are the dates and subjects for the Winter Course of Public Lectures in McMahon Hall:

January 16.—“The History of Temperance in the United States.” (Father Mathew Lecture). Rev. Dr. Walter J. Shanley.

January 23.—“Mithraism and Christianity.” V. Rev. Dr. Charles F. Aiken.

January 30.—“Catholicism and America.” V. Rev. Walter Elliott, C. S. P.

February 6.—“The Russian Church.” Rev. Sigourney W. Fay, S. T. L.

February 13.—“Catholicism and the Balkans.” Rev. Sigourney W. Fay, S. T. L.

February 20.—“Minor Irish Poets (1800-1850).” Dr. Patrick J. Lennox.

February 27.—“Our African Missions.” Monsignor Freri, D. C. L.

March 7.—“The Scholastics as Educators.” Rev. Dr. Patrick J. McCormick.

Lenten Course of Lectures. Very Reverend Doctor Pace is delivering a Lenten Course of Lectures at St. Patrick's, Washington, D. C., on “Catholic Men of Science.” Reverend Doctor Turner is giving a Course at La Salle Institute, New York, under the auspices of the Catholic Summer School of America, on “Catholic Philosophy and Contemporary Errors in Philosophy: Atheism, Agnosticism, Pantheism, Materialism, Idealism, Pragmatism.”

Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas. On Friday, March 7, the Feast of St. Thomas, Patron of the Faculty of Philosophy, and secondary Patron of the University, was celebrated in the chapel of Gibbons Hall. The celebrant of the Mass was the Very Reverend Father Skinner, C. S. P.